



EUROPEAN EXPRESSION

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REVIEW ON
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€ 10



YOURS IN LIBERTY, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY!

Nicos Giannis

Global Land Paths

Federalist responses to global challenges

We, the participants in the third Global Land Paths (GLAP III) seminar, held at Vitsa, under the auspices of The Land Beyond and

the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), from 30 July to 4 August 2016,

- ▶ having shared in freedom and mutual respect our knowledge and views on the topic “Federalist responses to global challenges”;
- ▶ inspired by the beautiful nature of the Northern Pindos National Park;
- ▶ conscious of the critical period that the world has entered, with insecurity and tensions increasing along economic, cultural and religious fault lines, armed conflicts and terrorist acts, finance disconnected from the real economy, increasing inequalities and a planet under severe ecological pressure; and
- ▶ building on the outcome of the previous GLAP seminars;
- ▶ agreed on the following key points of reflection for action:

SOVEREIGNTY should not be used as a pretext for human rights abuses, fragmentation and war; true sovereignty, in terms of inviolability of its bearer, resides only with each individual person, citizen of the world;

FEDERALISM is not tantamount to and should not be associated with centralised government distant from the people; instead it is intrinsically connected with subsidiarity, that is the principle of dealing with issues at the level of community organisation/government that is commensurate to the magnitude

of the problem and as close to the citizens as possible; there are several successful examples of federal states that one can learn lessons from;

GLOBAL ISSUES such as peace and security, climate change and human rights should be dealt with at the global level, which has to be adequately equipped, both in terms of democratic legitimacy and resources available;

The ideal of **One World**, expressed by Gandhi and other visionaries, still offers the only chance for humanity to get over war, disease and disaster, including ecological catastrophe; it should be pursued systematically, with evolutionary building blocks, through initiatives such as a UN Parliamentary Assembly and global disarmament, by having the long-overdue review of the UN Charter towards democratising the United Nations;

THE EUROPEAN UNION has been for decades a model of regional integration, peace, prosperity and respect of the rights of its citizens, as well as a responsible development donor and multilateral partner; it is thus important that it overcomes its current problems and continues on the road of federal integration, for the sake of its citizens and the world; **ACTIVE CITIZENS ALL OVER THE WORLD** – being the lifeblood, ultimate decision-maker and legitimiser of actions taken in their name and for their benefit – need to engage at all levels of governance, ensuring trust, transparency and accountability.

WE COMMIT TO DO OUR PART, individually and through organisations we work with and **call on all fellow world citizens**, who share our concerns about the huge challenges facing the world today and our assessment that federalism with legitimate local, national, regional and global governance as the best way to organise, to join us in this effort.

Vitsa, Epirus, Greece



Foundation for Global
Governance and Sustainability

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Excerpt from the comic "*Salute!*" by *Luke Ellison*

“F_{for} federalism not for fear anymore!”

A revolution of devolution. Strengths and weaknesses of federalism

T

he ‘f’ world is now less horrifying and less marginalized. For some it’s more attractive and promising, at least in Europe. But still, since it represents a revolution it is not yet mainstream. We live in an era of revolution of devolution. Power today is shifting more rapidly than ever, from the system of sovereign nations towards six directions (three territorial and three thematic): (1) Globalization, (2) wider entities like the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, Africa Union (3) local and regional government, (4) digitalization, (5) liberalization, (6) the civil society and non-state actors. Nevertheless, the national states, no matter how weak they might become, remain the major source of democratic accountability from which citizens have traditionally had legitimate expectations. Civil society liberates human thinking from any kind of government fetters and replaces in a certain extent voluntary cooperation between national governments with cooperation of transnational citizens’



Dr Nicos
Giannis

networks based to common values and/or interests. Digitalization, either in the form of a sharing economy or in the automation type, cannot be stopped through a return to barriers and borders, national security and laws. Liberalization speaks on its own on behalf of liberty - but not necessarily on behalf of freedom. Therefore, digital transformations, liberalization of the economy and the explosion of volunteering can’t be governed by the old narrow system of states; it becomes necessary to create new forms of governance and even of government. Federalism’s multiple checks and balances seems to be the most appropriate answer, although it is not so well known and not broadly and explicitly respected.

Foedus was a compact or a treaty contracted by ancient Rome, with one or more allied states (*foederati*). The treaty contained conditions establishing permanent friendly relations between the contracting parties, recognized as equals through an

agreement which obliged to assist each other in defensive wars or when otherwise called upon, in perpetuity.

Federalism is the form of constitutional arrangement inspired either by consociationalism or by the majoritarian concept. Consociationalism emerged and developed on the basis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic, linguistic and religious lines, as well as regulating class conflict (without clearly taking the form of corporatism), and it's maybe the most democratic form of power-sharing. The *humble* goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements and of democracy itself, as well as the avoidance of violence. Consociational theorists attempted to explain what is a non-territorial federal division of powers that constitutes a democratic alternative to either Jacobin or majoritarian democracy. The European idea in practice, namely the EU, has been proved consensual in principle whereas the USA system is based upon majoritarian federalism. Consociational arrangements work best and are longest-lived where they are combined with territorial federalism. Consociational arrangements have been applied in the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and Israel, among others.

A grand design or a general theory for the world to be democratically governed would be a comprehensive proposal for developing the ideal polity that will function in harmony with the principal forces in the universe. Moreover the polity should be realistic, that is to say, grounded on a realistic understanding of human nature, its limits, and its possibilities. This polity must be unavoidably federalist in essence; that is to say, every aspect of the polity is to be informed by federal principles and arrangements. Thus, coop-

eration and collaborative patterns are inherent to federalism. Instead, unitary states are characterized by conflictual attitudes and permanent conflict resolution mechanisms. Tyranny of the majority inside the sovereign state becomes predominant, implicit and even explicit sometimes, with a *natural* tendency towards perpetual expansion out of the borders. To simplify, federalism defends unity only within diversity, unitary systems defend diversity only within unity. Cooperation is internal in federal entities, cooperation is external "wishful thinking" between sovereign entities. Federalist constitutions are inspired by sharing sovereignty, unitary ones by "scaring" sovereignty! Federalism is bottom up, unitary is top down.

The older use of federalism to unite people living in different political units, who nevertheless shared a common language and culture (USA, Germany, Australia, the old United Provinces of the Netherlands, Swiss for 500 years), has thus become increasingly complemented in modern times by the use of federalism to unite people who seek the advantages of membership of a common political unit, but differ markedly in descent, language and culture. This is shown through the Spanish and Belgium examples, either highlighting how persistent the forces and traditions resisting the establishment of a unitary state have been (Spain, uphill federalism) or looking at the long process of internal differentiation along linguistic lines, (Belgium, downhill federalism). The wish to accommodate differences based on ethnicity led to the creation of the Canadian Confederation instead of a unitary state. The South African federal system suffers from the "the winner takes it all" deficiency. Nigerian and Mexican federalism suffer of weak and corrupted local and municipal governments making centralization of power and state control necessary. India being the biggest democracy in the world and the Australian continent are clear

proponents of impressively viable, size based federal systems.

Maybe the most important political development in recent years has been the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in Europe and of national isolationism, economic protectionism and border re-strengthening trends in at least part of the western world. Populist movements in the rich countries of the world happen for two main reasons: economic insecurity and cultural and identity reaction to perceived threats. Elements that are involved with economic insecurity include increased unemployment rates and very slow increase and even decrease of wages/salaries linked also to digitalization. Insecurity leads the people towards a defensive behavior, where they blame other cultures, using globalization, immigration, terrorist actions and ISIS atrocities as arguments. In Austria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Netherlands, France and UK we have witnessed similar cases. Populist parties dominated the national debates and used the general sense of national pride, egoism and nationalism. Nevertheless, even more important may be proved the fact that the EU itself, facing emerged populism, will deepen and strengthen soon as a new federal polity which is absolutely necessary nowadays in a semi-turbulent global scene. It will be not like the USA because of the deep-rooted ethnic and cultural differences inside Europe as well due to economic disparities and the concepts on the role of the government itself, statist attitudes and paternalistic trends being different to the USA. A sort of political union in the EU once achieved will likely further push towards sub-state autonomy (regionalism and localism).

Let's now present the civil society organizations. The World Federalist Movement (creation: 1947) is a global citizens' movement that advocates the establishment of a global federal system of strengthened and democratic global institutions subjected to the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity and democracy. Famous advocates of world federalism include Albert Einstein, Ma-

hatma Gandhi, Garry Davis and Lola Maverick Lloyd. The Union of European Federalists is a European non-governmental organization, campaigning for a Federal Europe. It has been active at the European, national and local levels. It was founded shortly after World War II with the belief that only a European Federation, based on the idea of unity in diversity and a common effort of European citizens, could overcome the division of the European continent that had caused the suffering and destruction of the two World Wars, and create a free, peaceful and democratic Europe. Famous advocates are Altiero Spinelli, Viktor Hugo, Count Kudenhorf Calergie, Mario Albertini, Ernesto Rossi, as well as pragmatic federalists like Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul Van Zeeland and Winston Churchill.

Federalism today can reconcile the simultaneous pressures in favor of big size and of the small scale. Federal constitutions and arrangements can accommodate better different ethnic identities and interests. The success depends on the depth of nationalistic passions, collective egoisms and individualistic attitudes, the number, size and strengths of competing groups and its depth on economic and knowledge management disparities, the existence of a minimum and mature democracy at the regional and local level ("federation of federations"), as well as on a strong civil society. Then comes the will to unite, under special circumstances, either because of external or hybrid threats to the whole emerging community or better, as the fruit of a long process of gaining gradual unity by voluntarily conceding national sovereignty due to both concrete and general perceived benefits to be derived from that unity, establishing a new mind map about external borders and not drawing new borders on the map.

Papers

from the

Global Land

Path Series Seminar

Never doubt that a small group
of thoughtful, committed citizens
can change the world.
Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.

Anthropologist Margaret Mead

VITSA.EPIRUS.HELLAS

GEORGIOS
KOSTAKOS

Some thoughts on Federalism

as an organising framework

for democracy, sustainable development
and peace

What drew me to Federalism was the search for a solution to the apparent failures of the state-based system at global and European level. In the name of sovereignty, which has been the organising principle of international society in recent centuries, and the proliferation of sovereign units through 19th century nationalism and 20th century decolonisation, we have ended up with some 200 countries claiming absolute power on their territories and competing with each other on the international stage. We could get even more such sovereign units if separatist movements around the world, including in European, have their way.

It is fully understandable that people who speak the same language, share a common history and culture, and are attached to a certain territory for generations want to govern themselves directly, without external interference or control from a far-away capital. At the same time, the tendency to break up former multi-ethnic states or empires into smaller, more homogeneous territorial units, leads to ever greater fragmentation of the political map. This often creates tensions over disputed areas or resources that have to be divided, undermines the rights of minorities left behind, and makes the planet increasingly more difficult to govern.

While this is the political reality – fuelled



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also by ambitious people who prefer to be the ultimate leaders of a small nation than members of a team in a bigger political unit – the reality of the challenges facing humanity as a whole points in a different direction. Most threats do not stop at state borders nor understand nationalist rhetoric. Certainly the problems of the environment, including sea and air pollution, and of course climate change, spread all over the world and require coordinated responses if they are to be tackled. Organised crime including drugs and human trafficking also finds its way through borders and challenges the law enforcement authorities of virtually all countries, as does radicalisation and terrorism. Moreover, the governance of the global economy and finance increasingly escapes the regulatory capacity of even the strongest of countries, requiring concerted action by the most powerful to contain crises (see the G20's role in the 2008 global financial crisis).

But what is the ideal size of a political unit, and could the whole world be one such unit, in order to effectively address all of today's challenges, a global empire of sorts? For some, globalisation and its promoters may be attempting this, unifying the world through seamless financial flows, free trade, telecommunications and transport. It is unclear, though, who is in charge, if anybody. The sheer magnitude of this

process and the interests at stake scare the average citizen, who often feels the stress of competition from cheaper markets, lower wages and weaker labour, health and environmental standards from other parts of the world. This has led to a significant increase in isolationist and xenophobic attitudes. In turn, populist leaders exploit this, promising a return to tighter national controls of cross-border trade and labour movements, among other things.

Such tendencies are clearly manifested in Europe, the integration project of which under the European Union banner seems to be in jeopardy. Under the pressure of millions of refugees flocking from Syria and other migrants from South Asia and Africa, the tendency of the European peoples is to build walls to save their own national units rather than join forces to solve the problems that the continent is facing as a whole. In view of wage competition from cheaper labour from the new EU member states in the East and other arguments pointing to counterproductive rules imposed by “Brussels”, the voters in a June 2016 referendum decided that the UK should leave the EU. Instead of ever-deepening union the EU is facing an unravelling of what has been achieved over six decades of economic and partially political integration.

In comes Federalism, as the white knight to save the situation. Despite common misconceptions, Federalism is not about creating a unitary state that absorbs all others. It is not about Brussels taking over and dictating its will on all EU nations. That never was nor does it ever need to be the case. Federalism is based on the principle of subsidiarity, which requires the governance functions to be carried out in democratic transparency as close to the citizen as possible. Only those functions that cannot be effectively performed at the regional/local level go to the state level, and again those that cannot be effectively performed at the state level are transferred to the overall “federal” level, or “Brussels” in the case of the EU.

This means, for example, that big items like foreign policy and defence should be brought to the federal level, while school curricula and traffic rules should remain at the national or local level. Of course, on many issues there is an overlap of competences, with a part that needs to be done at the national or local level and another one at the federal level. As a rule, the latter may prepare the overall framework and common set of rules, within which the national and local levels can provide further specificity according to national and local standards and proceed to act upon.

Thus in a federalist system the local and national entities

do not lose their legitimate authority, nor their sovereignty, for daily business. But when it comes to the bigger issue of basic common norms, prosperity, and peace and security for all, there is another sovereign entity that comes into play. It includes all federation parts and is a bit more than the sum, as it expresses the common interest. It can make decisions binding on all within its sphere of competence and behaves as sovereign vis-à-vis all external actors. This entity or level of government also has to be democratically elected and controlled through checks and balances, with a shared vision that speaks to and inspires all people.

This has been achieved in different but broadly successful ways in existing federations like the USA, Germany, Brazil, Australia and several others, while it seems to be failing in the case of the EU. Nevertheless, to some extent the EU has federal characteristics, as does the world as a whole with the United Nations at the centre. Instead of shying away from discussing such federalist realities, it is better to honestly examine the pros and cons of existing arrangements. The focus should be on improving the already interwoven system of governance, attributing to each level the due extend of sovereignty and competences for each continent and the world to function in the best possible way.

Of course, it is not only the constitutional arrangements by themselves that will bring about the desired peace and prosperity for all. The decisive factor will be what actual use will be made of these arrangements, the policies that will be introduced and their implementation. We should never lose sight of this bigger picture. Ultimately, the real proof of success is ensuring the well-being and human security of each and every citizen world-wide. Multi-level federalism offers a promising means to achieve this and is worth trying in earnest.

SHAHRYAR M. SHAREI

THE UN & COLLECTIVE SECURITY: Can the EU Transform the UN? Let's Get Our History Right

Most books and historians' accounts dealing with the foundation of the United Nations portray the organization as primarily a collective security arrangement to maintain "international peace and security", which arose from the "ashes of World War II" and represented a collaborative global effort unanimously supported by the states that gathered at San Francisco in the summer of 1945 to approve the Charter of the new organization. And further the main UN organ tasked to maintain global peace and security in this new international order was the Security Council and its five permanent members (P5).

This popular historical account is partly true. The first version of the "United Nations" was in fact set up in 1942 as part of the Atlantic Treaty and primarily as a military alliance to combat the Axis powers. However, the UN was essentially, albeit for good intentions, the project of one super-state – the USA – and its leader, President Franklin Roosevelt, having originated in the US State Department's plans for a new world order. It was the USA that shepherded the UN project through its various stages: the Tehran Conference of 1943, where the leaders of the "Big-3" powers, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, met for the first time; the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944, where the nuts and bolts of the new organization were finalized; the Crimea Conference of 1945, where the Yalta formula setting out the "veto"

power of the permanent five (P5) was devised; and the San Francisco Conference of 1945, where the UN Charter was finally adopted.

By and large, it was the USA that funded, designed and oversaw the creation of the UN. Of the other two Big-3 partners, the role of the UK was essentially advisory, while that of the Soviet Union was principally to lend legitimacy to the proposed UN system.

As for the role of the other European nations in the formation of the UN, and particularly the SC, this was virtually non-existent. Countries such as Germany and Italy that were labelled "enemy states" obviously did not participate in the San Francisco Conference, but many other European states were also excluded – among them Spain, Austria, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria, Sweden and Finland. As for the few European nations that were invited, when it came to discussing the UN's main function of peace and security, it seems that their sovereign voices and their opposition to the proposed structure of the SC did not count.

The Netherlands' foreign minister, Eelco van Kleffens, for example, objected to the fact that the SC would possess both "quasi-judicial" and executive powers, thus combining the role of jury, judge and executioner.



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The Belgian delegation, headed by foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak, although bowing to its US and UK liberators, nonetheless registered its objection to the proposed structure of the SC by abstaining rather than casting a “yes” vote. Both countries, along with their other European partners, also sought countermeasures to the power of the P5, with their efforts culminating in the inclusion of Article 109, which provides for a “full examination” of the Charter in a future review conference, in the belief that this would allow for subsequent reform of the SC. As an additional safeguard, Greece’s foreign minister, Ioannis Sofianopoulos, in collaboration with other European states, Australia, and many Latin American nations, pushed for the inclusion of what became paragraph 3 of Article 109, providing for a facilitated review conference to be held within a maximum of 10 years from the date of the Charter coming into force.

Even France, the state which was coopted as the fifth permanent member of the SC at San Francisco, but which had not been invited to either Dumbarton Oaks or Yalta, raised objections at the outset of the conference. France objected to the characterization of states as either “great” (the label the Big-3 had arrogated to themselves), or “small”, and had initially submitted proposals to modify the workings of the SC it deemed unfair.

However, with the exception of the would-be P5 members, the very limited number of European states invited to the 1945 conference saw their efforts to forge a more democratic and workable SC frustrated. In essence, the text of the Charter adopted in San Francisco remained as originally dictated by the Big-3 at Dumbarton Oaks. The non-permanents’ only hope was that the SC would be reformed in the not-too-distant future: following the review conference promised in Article 109.

The Beautiful UN and its Dark Side

After seven decades of existence, the UN can be viewed as made up of two contrasting parts: one of which has been largely beneficial, while the other has proved to be much less so. The valuable part consists of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the many related UN agencies that have become indispensable to the functioning of the global order and the lives of all the world’s citizens. The promotion and protection of human rights, how we use network connectivity and internet protocols, the way in which we deal with pandemics, and how we fly from one

corner of the earth to the other are all largely the fruits of the efforts of, respectively, the General Assembly and its sponsored human rights covenants, the International Telecommunication Union, the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization. These are just a few examples of what makes the UN system an integral part of our interdependent global lives.

The second, much less successful, aspect of the UN is the SC, charged with maintaining “international peace and security” and, under international law, the ultimate authority in respect of conflict resolution. It is also, by intention of its founders, the exclusive global organ mandated to employ coercive measures (military or non-military sanctions). However, the P5-dominated SC has failed in its mission, and failed miserably. After more than 70 years – spanning the earlier wars in Korea and Vietnam to the more recent conflicts in parts of Africa, and in Ukraine and Syria – the SC’s global security regime has witnessed hundreds of armed conflicts with tens of millions of dead, tens of millions more injured or displaced, and many trillions of dollars wasted on armaments and conflict-associated economic losses.

In resolving conflicts, the SC has essentially two modes of operation: intervention or inaction. On the few occasions where a member of the P5 has not wielded its veto – such as in respect of the First Gulf War in Iraq in the early 1990s, or in authorizing coercive action in Libya in 2011, essentially for regime change – to the far too frequent cases of the P5 having exercised their implied or explicit vetoes, the SC regime has largely failed. The catastrophic humanitarian situation in Syria, involving many states and non-state actors, is the latest example of such SC inaction.

This dark side of the UN, inherent in the structural and democratic deficiency of the SC, has not only been demonstrated in practice but the defect was fully apparent in 1945, foreseen by the non-P5 European and Latin American nations, as well as the few other “invited” states from Asia and Oceania. However, their concerns about the defects of the SC and the veto power of the P5 were ignored, even though these nations constituted the majority of states present at the UN conference. And, of course, many states forming the current membership of the UN were not in attendance at San Francisco, and hence played no role whatsoever in the shaping of the organization and its most powerful organ.

But why did those European nations that did attend the San Francisco Conference, and which objected to the proposed structure of the SC, nevertheless finally give their consent?

UN: Reform or Transformation? The EU's Role in Conducting a Charter Review

The year 1945 represents a significant date in human history and, as far as international law is concerned, can be considered year zero in the formation of the current system of global governance. It should be remembered that the world was still at war when the San Francisco Conference took place, but it was apparent that the Big-3 powers would be the victors. The delegates at the Conference therefore found themselves between a rock and a hard place when confronted with the Big-3's vision of the post-war global security regime, and the insistence of the USA, the UK and the USSR that the SC they had devised, complete with its veto power, be accepted "as is". With essentially no say and no choice in the matter, the other states consented to the proposed structure of the SC, but did so in exchange for what they regarded as an important bargain: the P5's promise that the UN Charter would be subject to amendment in the future, including the democratization of the SC. This commitment was enshrined in Article 109 Paragraph 3 of the Charter, which, in the view of most of its signatories and almost all the European states present at the conference, provided for a "general" and comprehensive review of the Charter to take place within 10 years of the instrument coming into force – a review that has still not occurred.

Instead of fulfilling their promise, it appears that the P5 have intentionally derailed any meaningful attempts at Charter revision, diverting them into multiple "open ended" UN reform committees that never reach a concrete conclusion. Furthermore, whether explicitly or implicitly, the guidelines and procedures of these various committees and working groups invariably prevent them from introducing amendments or reviewing the Charter. The *Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organisation*, for example, has been meeting since its formation in 1971, but has no right to propose changes to the Charter, and therefore has singularly failed to comply with its supposed mission to "strengthen" the UN.


With the Charter essentially frozen and "UN reform" an empty promise, it seems the member states need to become more proactive, initially outside of New York and the UN forum.

The 27-member European Union (assuming exclusion of the UK) includes not only P5-member France, with its

SC veto privilege, but also economic powerhouse Germany and influential global powers such as Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden. It thus constitutes a formidable bloc that the veto-wielding Russia, USA and China, and any other proponents of the SC status quo, cannot ignore.

In fact, Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union provides a legal basis for EU members to adopt a united stance in respect of the UN, since it requires, inter alia, EU member states that are also members of the Security Council (whether permanent or not) to "defend the positions and the interests of the Union". Thus, Article 34 enables EU members to forge a common policy towards the UN, including demanding the yet-to-be-held review of the Charter and its enhancement, in order to correct the UN's birth defect — the SC.

With most European states having had very little to do with the creation of the UN, and taking into account the great economic and geopolitical shifts of the past 70 years, coupled with the fact that the USA has long abandoned the vision of a UN-type of global common security (even more so under President Trump), it now appears that it is Europe's turn to take the initiative. The EU as a bloc should therefore audaciously take the lead in triggering the Charter review process, and be the primary change agent for democratizing and transforming the United Nations.



* The UN foundational accounts are mostly based on the 21-volume: *United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), 1945*, New York, UN-DPI.

YANNIS KARAMITSIOS
CHRISTOS BEZIRTZOGLU

The argument for a Federal European Union and a proposal for its governance



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 *Christos.
bezirtoglou*

**The strategic dilemma: moving on together,
or moving apart to irrelevance**

21st century is the century of globalization and divergence. It is the era where global challenges require global approaches. The world game of power, prosperity and competition is getting bigger and bigger; surely bigger than ever. Figures concerning people, economy, ecology, resources, trade, capital, investments, communication, transport, debts, deficits or surpluses count in billions or trillions. The political and economic players have to be large or specialized enough to compete successfully and safeguard their interests and values. Small political entities will inevitably move to the margins and become irrelevant.

Are the individual member states of the EU strong enough to

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Global challenges require global approaches. The world game of power, prosperity and competition is getting bigger than ever.

Europe needs to be prepared. It will soon have to decide about its strategic direction into the depths of that exciting era.

face that challenge? According to an estimation, not a single Member State of the European Union (EU) is going to belong to the top-9 economies of the world in 2050. It is also doubtful whether any Member State will figure among the top military powers. And, as of 2016, the most populous Member State (Germany) ranks only 17th in the list of world's countries per population.

Moreover the 21st century is going to be –like the previous two centuries- a time of radical breakthroughs, likely most radical than ever. This paper is not in position to make precise predictions about future technological achievements. However it is certain that Europe will need to face a world even more open, dynamic and competitive. Borders and local approaches will have negligible meaning in front of the explosion of communication, transport, energy production, food production, digital life, artificial intelligence, robotics, medical breakthroughs, genetics, military advancements and space technology. Fundamental issues will be raised, some of them for the first time. Science and politics will be called to define new notions such as “life”, “human being” or “consciousness”.

They will be also called to decide on the physical future of planet Earth, or even the presence of humanity on other planets. To produce and use technologies of unimaginable creative or destructive potential. It will be a world of two or three additional billions of people, expected under the current patterns to live much longer than today and consume further quantities of food, water, energy, metals, minerals and so on. The needs of those people will pose immense strains on natural environment. Those extra billions will also exchange a vast flow of information, views and perceptions within a very large and dense global network.

Europe needs to be prepared. It will soon have to decide about its strategic direction into the depths of that exciting era. What should be its position in the world? What are its options? How to address those advances?

We could roughly see four scenaria concerning the way ahead, taking into account the recent historic examples:

a. The “Medieval Kingdoms” scenario

The EU dissolves entirely, using Brexit as a starting point. Under that option, every Member State or region would form its own entity, possibly in a union together with other neighboring or distant countries. This paper



The sole way for Europe to be a world-wide protagonist is to remain pivotal in the radical developments of the changing era, to be a leader and a giver rather than a passive follower and receiver.

dismisses that option as simply outdated and out of step with history. It would bring the European people back to the dark ages of futile local antagonisms. It would divide residents of our small continent along lines of poverty, isolation and irrelevance.

b. The “three-Freedoms Union” scenario

The EU reverts back to a European Economic Union, in the sense of a huge free trade zone, but nothing more than that. Strong focus will be placed on the freedoms of goods, services and capitals, while Member States retain all other sovereign competences. This option should be seen as anachronism. As the experience of 1970s and 1980s has shown, a free trade zone is not adequate to defend the interests of its states and people. After a certain point of maturity, a closer political, economic and institutional union is necessary to defend and further boost the accomplishments of free trade in case of competing European and national interests.

c. The “Europe à la carte” scenario

The EU continues as a Union of sovereign states, more or less in its current form and with different levels of unification (such as eurozone, Schengen, etc). That Union would have a certain degree of integration but would also allow separate national choices on a variety of issues, including defense and foreign policy. This is neither a dynamic nor an ambitious option. It risks leading to counterproductive competitions between its member states, incoherent policies, economic stagnation, red tape, and unnecessary delays on the way to catch up with the rest of the world.

d. The “Federal European Union” scenario

The EU moves on as a sovereign state, titled Federal



The FEU Government will be supported by the FEU Commission as its exclusive administration. The President of the FEU Government will be the head of the FEU and the one to answer the phone if anyone wants to contact Europe.

European Union (FEU). A radical reform of institutions will need to take place. Strongly rooted habits, cultures and reflexes will need to be adapted to the new reality. Joint frameworks, from a common family law to a common military force, will have to be established. Serious investments and short-term sacrifices must be undertaken for the sake of long-term prosperity. This is perhaps the most difficult option; but most probably this is the sole way for Europe to stay in the center of the world and not move to its margins. To remain pivotal in the radical developments of the changing times. To be a leader and a giver, rather than a passive follower and receiver.

A new vision is thus required for Europe to remain a protagonist in whatever is going to seriously matter in this century. There is therefore a strong argument for an EU not in the current form of an international organization of sovereign member states, but in the form of a federal sovereign state in itself. This is the only way to face the global challenges as a single force.

The creation of a sovereign federal state

In this context, the time is right for the EU to become a sovereign federal state, the FEU. It will consist of separate federal entities, the individual Member States as known today. Those federal entities will retain a certain degree of autonomy and exclusive or parallel competences with the FEU in several policy areas. They will also retain their unique characteristics, flags, symbols or administrative borders. However they will not be sovereign countries any more.

Like all sovereign states, the FEU should enter the

world stage as a full member of the United Nations and all other international organizations, and should replace there all of its current member states. It should exercise exclusive or enhanced competence on all the key issues which matter for a global actor: foreign affairs, defense, social welfare, fiscal, taxation and monetary policies, border control, international trade, internal market, industrial, energy and agricultural policies, as well as asylum, visa and immigration affairs.

The FEU should also possess, in parallel with the federal entities, major competences in issues such as human rights, social security, pensions, and environmental policy. The nature, mission and competences of this new federation will have to be set out by an FEU Constitution replacing the existing EU Treaties.

The institutions and government of the new federal state

The FEU governance should be based on the classic democratic principles as developed in the continent since the 18th century: division of powers (executive, legislative and judicial), power checks and balances, parliamentary representation on the basis of popular vote, control rights to be exercised by the federal entities, as well as qualified majorities for the purpose of building consensus in critical issues.

In order to ensure a functional polity, the FEU will have to be led by a unicameral *FEU Parliament* and a *FEU Government*. Both of them will serve simultaneous four-year terms following a general election. Being a federation of many entities and hundreds of million of people, an additional layer of check should be introduced to control the work of those bodies: the *FEU Council of Governance*. Further, an *FEU Court of Justice* will carry out the classic judicial check of the executive and legislative powers. Finally, new financial institutions will be needed to support a co-ordinated growth and financial policy.

a. The FEU Parliament

The FEU Parliament should be elected directly by the people through general multi-party elections. It should be unicameral for the purpose of legislative efficiency and simplicity.

Only Europe-wide political parties will participate in those elections, and every party will have branches in a substantial number of federal entities. The political par-

ties will have to be based in many different federal entities to ensure their European and supra-national character.

The electoral system will be proportional representation with a low threshold for a political party to enter the parliament (e.g. 1% or 2%). Proportional representation with a low election threshold is necessary to reflect in a democratic manner the great diversity of European people and their diverging political directions.

The FEU Parliament will exercise the classic powers of modern national parliaments, by electing and controlling the FEU government. The composition of its members will be subject to minimum quotas of representation per federal entities and region. The FEU Parliament will grant its confidence to the FEU Government with the absolute majority of its members. It will reversely have the power to withdraw its confidence through a motion on non-confidence.

In case the FEU Government finishes its service before the end of its 4-years term (e.g. due to its resignation or motion of non-confidence), the FEU Parliament will appoint a new government until the end of the term of its mandate without the need for a new general election. New general elections during the term of the FEU Parliament will only be possible under extraordinary circumstances specified by the FEU Constitution and under the approval of a qualified majority of the FEU Parliament members (e.g. 75%). This is important to ensure the normality of the election cycles and ensure political stability and continuity.

The FEU Parliament will vote the annual FEU budget and other important laws determined by the FEU Constitution by a specific qualified majority (e.g. 60% of members), while a simple majority would be required for all other acts. Qualified majorities are necessary to ensure consensual majorities on the most critical matters, given the wide extent and variety of people.

b. The FEU Government

The FEU Government will be headed by a President and two Vice-Presidents. It will consist at least of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Economy, Trade, Justice and Human Rights, Industry, Energy, Environment, Immigration and Agriculture. It will be supported by the *FEU Commission* as its exclusive administration. By way of delegation by the FEU Constitution or, as applicable, by the FEU Parliament, it will be empowered to issue executive decrees on technical issues of lesser political importance.



The nature, mission and competences of the new sovereign federal state will be set out in the FEU Constitution that will replace the existing EU Treaties.

The President of the FEU Government will also be the head of the federation. He or she will carry the ultimate political responsibility for the EU affairs. He/she, or his/her responsible Minister, will be the one to answer the phone if anyone wants to contact Europe on the respective matter. He/she will be the face of Europe to the rest of the world.

The two Vice-Presidents will hold distinct positions above all Ministers. They will be in charge of the coordination of the work of the government, the coherency of its policies, the compromise of any differences between the Ministers and the connection of their work with the big picture that the FEU government has set as its objective. One of them will be nominated as first Vice-President and replace the President in cases of need.

However neither the President nor the government will be omnipotent. They will be removed following the loss of confidence of the FEU Parliament, and will be subject to the checks of the FEU Parliament, the FEU Council of Governance and FEU Court of Justice.

c. The FEU Council of Governance

The FEU Parliament and the FEU Government will be controlled in their routine functions by the FEU Council of Governance. That Council will consist of representatives of the federal entities governments, parliaments, regions, professional associations and civil society.

Its mission will be threefold:

- i) to be consulted before the adoption of any act of the FEU Government or FEU Parliament;
- ii) to check whether any of those acts is in accordance with the subsidiarity rules, and turn to the FEU Court of Justice in case it considers that the principle of subsidiarity or the FEU Constitution is not respected; and
- iii) to exercise a veto by qualified majority of its

members against any act of the FEU Government or FEU Parliament on the basis of substantial policy grounds.

The purpose of that Council is thus to exercise an important check of the central FEU institutions on behalf of FEU's federal entities, regions and society. It will not serve as co-legislator, but a last bastion in case it considers that "Brussels" regulates against the FEU Constitution or in stark contrast with the will of European people concerning particular policies.

The precise composition of that Council and the election of its members should be subject of further specialized work and negotiations. Several seats must be reserved for the official representatives of the federal entities and their parliaments. Several other seats will be reserved for the representatives of regions, the professional associations and civil society groups. The appointment or election of those members could be partly based on the practice of the current Committee of Regions and European Social and Economic Committee, which will be both be absorbed by that new Council.

d. The judiciary

Three sectors of *FEU Courts* (civil, administrative and criminal), as well as *FEU Prosecutors* offices, will be established to adjudicate on all matters of federal EU competence. They will have branches in all federal entities. All judges and prosecutors will be appointed, promoted or dismissed by independent assessment boards.

Those Courts will be politically supervised and administered by the FEU Ministry of Justice. That Ministry will be in charge of the adoption of civil, administrative and criminal legislation, the support of the court administration and the provision of its infrastructure and resources. The function of the FEU Court will be supported by FEU training schools for judges-prosecutors and a career-long training cycle.

e. The financial and other institutions

An *FEU Central Bank* will be established under a new constitutional framework, and will retain and enhance the roles of its predecessor. It will have the exclusive competence to issue the single currency for the FEU, the euro.

Several "sister" FEU Banks should be created to boost growth and jobs. We could offer the example of four such institutions: a *FEU Energy and Infrastructure Bank*, a *FEU Regional and Social Cohesion Bank*, a *FEU Industrial and Commercial Bank* and a *FEU Primary Sectors Bank*. While

retaining their independent status, those banks should be public to a substantial extent and operate in co-ordination with the FEU Ministry of Economy. They could function as public-private partnerships. They would be used as leverages for focused development initiatives and cover specific gaps and needs of the European society. In that function, they could replace or complement the existing *European Investment Bank* (EIB).

Several other FEU institutions, such as the *FEU Court of Auditors*, *FEU Ombudsman* and *FEU Data Protection Supervisor*, will be established under the new constitutional framework as institutions of a sovereign federal state. Their current competences will be retained and further enhanced.

Subsidiarity and direct democracy

The principle of subsidiarity, and how to apply it, is a central topic at the heart of the European project since its inception in the 1950s. Federal entities and regions must retain a number of clear competences, and enjoy a sense of a substantial degree of sovereignty and ownership of the European project. This would also be the most realistic approach¹, as the FEU would lack the resources to deal with all topics that concern the lives of more than half a billion people.

An indicative list of the federal entities' competences could include many aspects of health, education, public order, national judicial systems, culture, sports, religious affairs, regional and local governance. As mentioned above, the prime function of the FEU Council of Governance would be to defend the principle of subsidiarity and help federal entities and regions in this respect.

While federal entities would retain their mode of self-governance, a certain common understanding should also be reached on the deepening of the democratic institutions within all four levels of governance (FEU, federal entities, regional and local). Several tools of democratic governance, such as referenda, public consultations or transparency practices should be better shared. FEU should play a role in this by singling out the best of those practices and elevating them to commonly accepted standards. For instance, a successfully conducted referendum

1 Νίκος Γιαννής, Αρχή της Επικουρικότητας: Αρχή Ελευθερίας, Συμμετοχής και Ευθύνης, Ευρωπαϊκή Έκφραση-Ίδρυμα Φρίντριχ Νάουμαν για την Ελευθερία & Κέντρο Φιλελεύθερων Μελετών (ΚεΦιΜ) - Μάρκος Δραγούμης, 2015

in the municipality of Cologne, or a public consultation in the region of Catalonia, or a transparency website in the federal entity of Estonia could be promoted as model cases. They could further lead to the creation of non-binding standards of governance to be adopted and deepened by all “subsidiarity stakeholders”, namely federal entities, regions and municipalities. Such an approach could strengthen the principle of subsidiarity without violating its core.

Finally, and in order to support the principle of direct democracy, FEU referenda should be organised on critical political and policy decisions to be taken. Given the enormity of their scale (400 or more million participants) clear rules should be set concerning their initiation, organization and public debate prior to them. Due to their critical importance, the initiation of each FEU referendum should be subject to the endorsement of the FEU Government, the FEU Parliament and the FEU Council of Governance.

Conclusions for further research

This paper presented a visionary approach of the future of Europe.

Against the sweet calling of the populists sirenes of populism, significant similarities and common interests among the people of Europe still exist. They thus need to be further highlighted and advanced.

The authors hope that this article will generate additional research, thus allowing for better understanding over the implications of the main actors and their policy instruments. This is important for a strong Europe in a globalized world.

Disclaimer: This text only represents the personal views of its authors in their private capacities, and not the position of the European Commission in any respect




GINO DEBO

Is (cooperation) federalism a tool for conflict resolution or a tool to split up (Belgium)?

Belgium was founded in 1830. The Dutch-speakers live in the north of the country, in Flanders. Wallonia, in the South of the country, is French speaking. The capital Brussels is bilingual, French and Dutch speaking. There is a small German speaking community in the east of the country.

Belgium consists of 3 regions, the Flemish region (Vlaams Gewest), the Walloon region (Région wallonne) and the Brussels-Capital Region (Brussels, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale in French, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest in Dutch). The competences of the regions are linked to the territory: transportation, public works, water policy, economic policy, environment, etc.



On the other hand, there are three communities in the country: the Flemish community (Vlaamse Gemeenschap), the French speaking community (Communauté française) and the German speaking commu-



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nity (Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft). The Flemish community includes also the Dutch speaking citizens of Brussels, the French speaking community includes also the French speaking citizens in Brussels. The capital of the German speaking community is Eupen. The competences of the Communities are linked to the person: education, culture, taking care of elderly and disabled people, etc.

There are 4 language areas in Belgium: the Dutch one in the north, the French speaking area in the south, the bilingual area Brussels (Dutch and French) and the German speaking area in the east.

The Brussels Region has had its own specific existence and institutions since 1989. Regional competences are exercised by the institutions of the Brussels-Capital Region. Community competences are exercised in Brussels by, on the one hand, the French and Flemish Communities and, on the other hand, by the three Community Commissions (GGC/CCC, COCOF and VGC, see table).

The Federal government is responsible for Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, etc.

The leaders of the different governments are:

1. Belgian federal government: prime minister Charles Michel (MR)

2. Flemish Government (Community +Region): Geert Bourgeois (N-VA)
3. French Community Government: Rudy Demotte (PS)
4. Walloon Regional Government: Paul Magette (PS)
5. Brussels-Capital Regional Government: Rudi Vervoort (PS)
6. German Community Government: Oliver Paasch (ProDG)

	Parliament (legislative)	Government (executive)	Normative instruments
Brussels-Capital Region	Council of the Brussels-Capital Region (or the Brussels Parliament)	Government of the Brussels-Capital Region	Orders
GGC/CCC	Joint Assembly of the Joint Community Commission	Joint College of the Joint Community Commission	Orders /regulations
COCOF	Council of the French Community Commission	College of the French Community Commission	Decrees/regulations
VGC	Council of the Flemish Community	College of the Flemish Community Commission	Verordening

Source: Brussels Capital Health and Social Observatory (accessed on 17 October 2016)

Each government is controlled by its parliament.

The federal government and the federal parliament proclaim laws. The regional and community governments and parliaments make decrees. The regional government of Brussels and its parliament make ordinances.

What happens in case of conflict between the different levels ? The Consultative Committee tries to find a solution. It is chaired by the prime minister and the other members are the Minister-presidents of the regional or the community governments.

On the juridical level, the Constitutional Court has the power to annul, to declare unconstitutional and suspend laws, decrees and ordinances. Legally, laws and decrees are equal.

An overview of the state reforms:

- First state reform (1893) – Suffrage: more men allowed to vote, women not. Reform of the Senate.
- Second state reform (1921) – Universal suffrage: women also allowed to vote,
- Third state reform (1970) – Cultural communities established (Flemish demand). Constitutional foundations for territorial regions (Walloon demand).
- Fourth state reform (1980) – Cultural communities become communities, with more competences related to personal matters. Territorial Flemish and Walloon regions established (Brussels Region later). Communities and Regions get their own Parliaments and Governments.
- Fifth state reform (1988–1989) – Education transferred to communities. Brussels Region established.
- Sixth state reform (1993) – Belgium becomes a fully-fledged federal state. Communities and Regions get more competences and their Parliaments are now directly elected.
- Seventh state reform (2001) – More competences to the Regions (agriculture and oversight over local

government). Refinancing of the Communities and Regions.

- Eighth state reform (2011) – More competences to the Regions and Communities. The constituency of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde was split. Refinancing of the Communities and Regions (transfer of 20 billion € from federal level).

The state reforms took place against the backdrop of the dominance of the French in Belgium and Flanders in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. The official language in Flanders in the 19th century was French. Dutch became the official language at Ghent university only in 1930. Two years later Dutch became the official language of the public administration in Flanders, before it was French. In 1967 the Dutch text in the Belgian Official Journal became legally binding as well.

On the socio-economic level the differences between the regions are significant. Currently, the unemployment rate in Wallonia is much higher than in Flanders (see chart), although in the 19th century the South of the country was richer than the North.

The regional distribution of GDP gives a similar picture (see table). Why?

- Foreign Direct Investment in the port of Antwerp allowed it to grow quickly.
- Underinvestment by holdings in the steel sector in Wallonia.
- The closure of coal mines in Wallonia and Limburg in Flanders.
- The closure and merger of steel factories in Wallonia. Reconversion is a difficult process.

Taux de chômage dans les provinces de Belgique (pourcentages de la population âgée de 15 à 64 ans, 2015)



Recently, however, Wallonia becomes economically a more dynamic region.

Unemployment rate 2015

Source: Conseil supérieur de l'emploi, Rapport 2016

THE BELGIAN ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Table 7.8 Regional distribution of GDP, 1960–70 (in percentages)

Year	Wallonia	Flanders	Brussels	Belgium
1960	32.1	45.1	22.8	100
1966	30.0	51.6	16.4	100
1970	29.1	53.8	17.1	100

Source: Belgique: pays en voie 1978: 64

Source: Mommen Andre, *The Belgian economy in the twentieth century*, 1994, p. 132

To conclude, three questions:

1. Is (cooperation) federalism a tool for conflict resolution or a tool to split up ?

2. Cooperation becomes more complicated. The coalition partners in different governments are not the same, (e.g. French speaking socialist party (PS) is in the regional governments doesn't take part in the federal government). Consequently, they have different interests. Moreover, the main objective of the biggest political party in Flanders (N-VA) is the independence of the Republic Flanders (art. 1 Rules of the party).

3. Does the transfer of competences go too far ? Some want to make the federal state stronger again, others want to make it weaker yet.

Further reading:

- Federalism in the European Union, edited by Cloots, Elke.; Baere, G. de.; Sottiaux, Stefan, Oxford, Hart Pub., 2012.
- The Constitution of Belgium, Haljan, David, The International Encyclopedia of Laws, Wolters Kluwer (Alphen den Rijn), 2015
- Beyond federal dogmatics: the influence of EU law on Belgian constitutional case law regarding federalism, Feyen, Stef, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2013
- Mommen André, *The Belgian economy in the twentieth century*, Routledge, 1994



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GLOBAL CHALLENGES: Unemployment, Income Distribution, Inequality

This paper aims briefly to analyse the challenges which our societies are confronted with at global level and responses to be found at global and regional level, with a particular emphasis on responses by the European Union.

Globalisation for the past forty years or so has meant a trend towards overall revenue redistribution across continents and nations and rising inequalities in individual income: the wealthiest fifth of world population received 82,7% of total riches worldwide whereas the poorest fifth received 1,4% of global income in 1992¹. According to a 2015 report by Credit Suisse², the top 1% own half the wealth and the poorest half own just 1%. Inequality has been rising steadily in the United States and in Europe in particular and is expected to continue doing so. The more vulnerable groups are low skilled workers who are hit by the rise of longterm unemployment. The risk of greater poverty and disenfranchisement should be a major concern.

Part of these negative trends may be linked to obsolete parameters in economic governance



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where, under the pressure of global competition, bringing production costs down has been given strategic priority and, among these costs, lower wages considered a key to boosting competitiveness. Another structural factor is automation and the rise of the digital economy whose impact on income distribution is yet uncertain.

Another factor, cyclical this time, has been the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on worldwide economies whose distant cause was the structure of income distribution in the United States: the abundance of poor workers has not guaranteed stable income, the frailty of private pension schemes leading to an overwhelming rise of the financial economy generating major instability in the domestic economy and then in the global economy. In addition, no stimulus to European economies can be expected from China, currently in soft landing, nor from emerging economies (Brazil, oil producers) which themselves have entered a deep crisis.

This is clearly a challenge from an ethical point of view but also for prospects of an inclusive growth where social cohesion and economic stability are mutually supportive. Federalist responses must be found at global and regional level.

European challenges

Looking at European economies need not make us extraordinarily optimistic: pre-2008 unemployment was 4.8% overall and had risen

1 UNDP Global Development Report 1992 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992)

2 James Davies, Rodrigo Lluberas and Anthony Shorrocks, Credit Suisse Global Wealth Data Book 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/money/2015/oct/13/half-world-wealth-in-hands-population-inequality-report>



The top 1% own half the wealth and the poorest half own just 1%

to 11% of active population in the Eurozone at the end of 2015. 25% of young people are currently Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEETs), a trend which is totally unsustainable. In a context of consolidating of public finances, our welfare systems, mostly financed by contributions levied on wages, are severely impaired by long term and the lack of a fiscal reform.

Responses to the trends of the past 30 to 40 years have been slow and faulty. The European Monetary Union was launched as an incomplete construction to be remedied at the very time of its implementation. With no liberty to devalue, real economies took the brunt of adjustment and national economies were affected in a diverse way by cyclical shocks leading to growing divergence among them and to an emerging imbalance between North and South, creditor and debtor countries.

The initial flaw in the EMU, a monetary union without central fiscal power (the European budget at 1% GDP is by far too small to absorb cyclical shocks) and without European economic policy, just a weak coordination of national policies, was laid bare yet unremended, for lack of agreement among the Member States.

The Internal Market itself was left incomplete, granting the EU only supplementary powers to address interstate workers' mobility (Article 153 TEU) and the needs of crossborder populations. A number of policies were devised for the portability of social rights, nondiscrimination, information and consultation of workers, health and security at work, working time etc. but the bulk of social policies remained within the reserved competence of the Member States. The European social acquis being weak and fragmented, the latter were able to turn to, or not act against, social competition ("social dumping"), further deepening the divide between outsiders and insiders on the job market and the growing gap between the core and the periphery. Pressure to correct these practices has been slow³. The ensuing risk of internal devaluation is well known, following the debt crisis: social tensions, political disen-

3 Germany adopted a minimum wage in 2015 and started to boost its domestic demand (depressed since its 2003-5 Laws for Reform of the Job Market" or. Hartz Reforms.

chantment, the rise of populism and nationalism (Brexit being one case, although by a non Eurozone country), if not xenophobia. This could show the way for a European, if not global, rethink⁴.

Possible, though urgently needed, responses

The lessons of the recent crisis however have yet to be fully drawn in order to address the imperative of European cohesion and inclusiveness. On 22 June 2015, the Five Presidents' report "Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union"⁵ recommended improving the European social performance ("social triple A") by counteracting deflationary pressures and correcting internal imbalances on the labour market, especially long term unemployment. Taxation (shifting taxes away from labour) was also part of the picture.

This led to revamping the European economic governance so as to address the challenge of unemployment, though there was no breakthrough: in particular, the coordination of economic policies in the framework of the European Semester and Better Regulation agenda has been upgraded to take social indicators into better consideration ("scoreboard") and avoid one size fits all solutions. The Youth Employment initiative together with the contribution of the European Social Fund (topped up by the eligible Member States' own financial resources).was endowed with € 6,4 billion for the period 2014-2020 to support the provision of apprenticeships, traineeships, job placements and further education leading to a qualification to young people under 25.

The change bears on the new emphasis which is laid on internal demand and internal imbalances within the Eurozone. The existing coordination of national policies with European financial supplements may however prove insufficient. In a monetary union, a federal budget amounting to 5-6% of aggregate GDP would provide the adequate leverage and act as an automatic stabiliser for the Eurozone as a whole to smooth out large economic shocks. The prospect of "a macroeconomic stabilisation function to better deal with

4 See the IMF's Independent Evaluation Report of 28 July 2016 on the EU/IMF handling of the bailout crisis <https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/news/commission-and-imf-clash-over-influence-of-politics-over-bailout-programmes/>

5 Presidents of the European Commission, the European Council, the Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and the European Parliament. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf

shocks that cannot be managed at the national level alone” is in the 5 Presidents’ report but it is a medium/long term one (after mid- 2017) and deemed not to address cyclical ups and downs.

Another prospect is an effective social protection system is in place to protect the most vulnerable in society, including a ‘social protection floor’. This has led to preparatory work for an initiative to be presented by the Commission by early 2017 on a Europe-wide social policy in times of economic crisis reinforcing the portability of rights for mobile persons and ensuring minimal rights.

Other reflections bear on an EU unemployment insurance which the Slovak Presidency has promised it would promote with the aim of stabilisation. Several schemes are under study and often consider an EU core insurance with national top-ups within the Eurozone. This would mean a transfer of competence to the European level or radical reforms of national schemes, in some cases. An alternative scheme was proposed by a member of UEF Federal Committee⁶ and discussed in Brussels on 16 June on the initiative of UEF Group Europe⁷. As in the US Unemployment Compensation System, the scheme would leave national systems basically untouched and proposes a European solidarity mechanism for cyclically unemployed persons.

Social policy being about nation-building, it is no surprise that schemes must be acceptable also to those who are concerned about subsidiarity and the risk of “moral hazard”. The proposal for an European Unemployment Insurance Scheme addresses moral hazard by providing a trigger mechanism (an unemployment rate of more than 7% and more than double of the rate of the previous year) and an obligation for the Member States to repay loans to the dedicated EU fund within 3-5 years. There would therefore be no permanent transfer which some fear would make Member States irresponsible. As in the US UCS, an exceptional EU budget would provide for exceptional action in case of a deep recession, based on an additional resource (FTT or other).

There remains the issue of the political support for such a scheme and for increased budgetary powers for the European Parliament and Council under exceptional economic circumstances. Yet, many economists have pointed to the



Major risk to the global economy stems from rising inequalities

major risk to the global economy stemming from rising inequalities. As for the Eurozone, it has exhausted the possibilities of quantitative easing by the ECB and is left today with few instruments except boosting demand and investment to manage very slack growth and high unemployment. A fair and predictable mechanism to address cyclical unemployment, protect aggregate demand when some Member States have a downturn should be acceptable for deficit and surplus countries. This is the only way to address the aggregate needs of the Eurozone and ensure all Member States adequate stabilisation of the economy.

The exchanges that followed confirmed that countries like India have themselves adopted an Unemployment Allowance (50% of an insured worker’s daily average earnings for up to one year) in 2005, though there is no minimum wage. Participants agreed to the observation that inter-regional inequality, when not compensated by some form of equalisation or transfer, can lead to the rebellion of some territories. They also observed that such issues demand raising awareness among workers and decision-makers, and this takes time and effort. One further observation which could be made is that regional and global responses to the flaws in income distribution must converge and that problems unsolved at the regional level do impact global economies (social dumping or relocation of activities being one form of this impact).



⁶ “For a Federal European Unemployment Insurance Scheme», Domenico Moro, <http://www.federalists.eu/publications>

⁷ Group Europe on FB: <https://www.facebook.com/UEF-Groupe-Europe-463139700456044/>

New Federalist manifestos

Federalism
isn't about states' rights.
It's about dividing power
to better protect individual liberty.

Elizabeth Price Foley

CHRISTOS
BEZIRTZOGLU

I am not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world!*

The European Union is the outcome of a successful peace project based primarily on the foundations of economic co-operation at the aftermaths of the 2nd World War.

However, new globalization forces are putting this project in question in the hearts and minds of people.

“More Europe” should not only mean a series of freedoms (i.a. free circulation of people, goods, services and capital) or common markets (i.a. Internal, Currency, Digital, Energy, Defence) for Member States based on national priorities.

Citizens start looking beyond national leaders - who often adopt a populist rhetoric forgetting their responsibilities and wanting only rights for their own kinds - to European solutions.

The big picture is Europe and not the European Union Member States. Flexible integration at the level of full-fledged paneuropean political integration will be the status ex-post. Federalizing Europe is about rebuilding

* Paraphrasing a saying by Socrates, from Plutarch, Of Banishment, Greek philosopher in Athens (469 BC - 399 BC)



**Christos
Bezirtzoglou**

*Policy officer in the
European Commission*

foundations and refocusing on the essentials. Reinforcing an inclusive economic and social regional cohesion in a sustainable and ecological development leading to a reboot strategy for a reinforced federal Europe.

Europeans need from future European institutions a better deal in the globalization era based on core European values such as culture, freedom and rule of law. Federalism is the meeting point of all groups¹.

For writers and artists, Europe's greatness was its culture;

For economists and practically minded people, it's tremendous wealth;

For liberals, its commitment to liberty and the rule of law;

For socialists, it's devotion to equality and fairness;

For visionaries, a federal European Republic².

1 Quoting Khil Raj Regmi, Prime minister of Nepal and Asian's Dignitary man of the Year 2015

2 Paraphrasing text from the book “Whose Liberty is it anyway? Europe at the Crossroads” by Stefan Auer and Nicole Scicluna, Seagull Books, 2012

ALTIERO
SPINELLI

“It will be the moment
of new action
and it will be the moment
for new people:
the moment for a free and united Europe”

«Si je savais quelque chose utile à ma patrie, et qui fût préjudiciable à l'Europe,(...) je la regarderois comme un crime.»

Montesquieu

More than ever, the challenges we are facing today are worldwide: climate change, pressure on resources, environmental destruction, economic and financial difficulties, security, fair trade, peace-building, respect for human rights and civil liberties.

In our contemporary world, every European country is a small country. But we have one advantage: together we have built our European Union. It is a remarkable construction in which European states, many for too long divided by protracted conflicts, decided to be “united in diversity” and form common Community.

Striving for shared peace and prosperity, we managed to work together and combine forces, thus fostering unprecedented prosperity, democracy and reconciliation on our continent. National states have conceded sovereign powers to common institutions in order to reach common goals and an “ever closer” Union.

Unfortunately, whereas the formidable challenges of a complex crisis demand common responses at European level, too many politicians believe that solutions still lie at the national level. In a time of interdependence and in a globalised world, national solutions cannot provide adequate solutions. Only



European solution can be successful.

Today things are moving in the opposite direction, towards a looser rather than a closer Union. Too often the Community spirit is forgotten in favour of short-term national

interests. And too often intergovernmental solutions prevail over real European solutions.

We oppose this backward and reactionary direction. It is time to bring a common European approach back to the forefront. This is not the moment for Europe to slow down further integration, but on the contrary to accelerate it. The European Union's history has time again proven that more Europe, not less, is the answer to the problems we face. Only with European solutions and a renewed European spirit will we be able to tackle the worldwide challenges.

National solutions are solutions of the past. Our goal is a federal and post-national Europe, a Europe of the citizens. This was the dream the founding fathers worked so hard to achieve. This was the project of Altiero Spinelli. This is the Europe we want. This is the Europe we will fight for. Because this is the Europe of the future.

[http://spinelligroup.eu/
sign-manifesto](http://spinelligroup.eu/sign-manifesto)



UEF *Union of European Federalists*

Towards Federal Union

Europe is passing through a period of turbulence and uncertainty. The long financial crisis, which has led to economic stagnation, unemployment and political fragmentation, has exposed not only the flaws in the design of the Economic and Monetary Union and the weakness of EU institutions, but also a lack of commitment to European integration by EU states. As a result, the European Union has lost the trust of many citizens.

The crisis in the regions bordering the European Union, from Ukraine to the Middle-East, is putting increasing pressure on progressing European integration in the foreign, security and defence field. If the European Union is to survive for years to come, it must pursue the paths of social peace, prosperity and political unity through the business of democratic government. A federal Europe with strong democratic institutions is the only way to meet this challenge. Europe will not be united if it is not democratic. And it will not be democratic if it is not a federation. The process of building a genuine European federal union can start today with the euro-zone and those states genuinely committed to joining the euro. It is the responsibility of our decision makers to take all the necessary steps to solve the problems, put our affairs in order and rebuild confidence. We therefore urge the political parties, the Members of the European Parliament elected

in 2014 and the new European Commission to make the accomplishment of a federal union a central theme of their activity. And we urge the European Parliament to develop its proposals on the structure of federal union alongside representatives of national parliaments.

Dealing with the crisis

Federalists believe that only deeper fiscal integration will lead Europe out of the crisis and fulfil Europe's economic and democratic potential. This new polity has to be formed around the states whose currency is or will soon be the euro. At national level, fiscal discipline must be accompanied by economic reforms. At both European and national levels a better balance must be struck between fiscal consolidation and investment in growth and jobs: fiscal union is not viable without social justice. Tackling youth unemployment must be the priority. It has become clear that purely national recovery plans have been largely ineffective. Only by creating the tools and resources for common European economic, industrial and energy policies can we boost trade and competitiveness, stimulate research and education, build trans-European networks and complete the single market in services.

<http://www.federalists.eu/uef/manifesto>



UEF welcomes the legislation already in place which will ensure budgetary responsibility at the national and European level. Now we urge the eurozone to make rapid progress to address the burden of debt which is destroying opportunity for too many European citizens. We need adequate forms of European taxation and new forms of European debt instruments for a proactive European social and economic policy. We need to replace ad hoc policy conditionality with democratically legitimated policies and measures, including automatic stabilisers, which enhance solidarity and growth for a European social market economy if the conditions and rules of fiscal stability and structural changes are met. These steps require the transformation of the eurozone into a true political union. And those states which have yet to join the euro, and are intent on doing so, must be connected as closely as possible to this process of deeper integration.

A Beter Democracy

UEF believes that the EU will only survive and prosper by enhancing European democracy: we act to strengthen the European public space, with citizens fully engaged at every stage of the constitutional process. We should transfer to the European Commission most of the residual executive powers now held by the Council, at least in the economic and fiscal field, turning the Commission into a recognisable and accountable government. The size of the Commission should be reduced, with its members nominated by the President-elect and elected by the European Parliament. The new structure of the Commission proposed by Mr Juncker, with the appointment of seven Vice Presidents, and the creation of project teams, are a good step in this direction.

The two legislative chambers of the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing. The composition of the Parliament should be determined by logical, transparent and understandable rules on the basis of the population of the states, respecting the principle of degressive proportionality. In order to build up real European political parties and to heighten the EU dimension of politics, a certain number of MEPs should be elected in a pan-European constituency from transnational lists. Parliament must gain the right of consent to treaty changes and to the accession of new states. Restrictions on the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice should be lifted, and access to the Court eased for individuals.

Treaty Change

The Treaty of Lisbon is being stretched to breaking point under the pressure of crisis management. Its revision is unavoidable if the Union is to overcome its present difficulties. We therefore call for a constitutional Convention to begin as soon as possible. The Convention will be composed of MEPs, national MPs, the Commission and the state governments. But it must reach out to the media, political parties, civil society and public opinion in direct and effective ways. Its mandate must include the task of explaining and justifying the decisions it takes. The agenda of the Convention must be open, but shaped by a coherent political strategy based on the refoundation and renewal of the European Union around a federal vanguard. Its task will be to draft a new fundamental law which provides a durable settlement of the system of governance of the Union, along with a clearer sense of things to come. The new treaty must further enhance the capacity of the Union to act at home and abroad. It must be a strong constitutional framework in which its governors and law makers are empowered to make coherent and efficient choices about the direction of policy. Member states must respect the values and principles of their Union, and the EU needs to be alert and to react effectively when changes to national constitutions depart from them. A genuine common immigration and asylum policy is needed to make a reality of the EU area of freedom, security and justice. Responsibilities for the control of the external frontiers of the Union must be decently shared, and the human rights of migrants fully respected. Consular rights

of EU citizenship should be strengthened, and EU consular posts promoted. EU citizens living in other EU states should be allowed to vote in all elections at their place of residence. The scope of the European Citizens' Initiative should be widened and its application made more accessible. The European Union will not be the global actor it aspires to be unless its states make a more serious political commitment to developing common foreign, security and defence policies. At the moment, Europe is not only failing to defend its own values and interests but also to fulfil its potential to be a source of good in world affairs. EU citizens have a strong commitment for peace. In order to achieve these objectives the treaty revision must not fail to adjust competences and increase the powers of the European institutions where necessary.

Federal Government

The main new feature of the fundamental law will be the installation of a federal government, with a powerful Treasury Secretary, for the fiscal and economic union. The eurozone must have its own fiscal capacity, capable of contributing to macro-economic stabilisation. The EU budget should be financed by genuinely autonomous own resources such as taxes on carbon emissions or financial transactions which, by moving away from the current system of direct national contributions, will allow the federal core to escape from the paralysis of *juste retour*. The new treaty must permit the progressive mutualisation at least of a portion of sovereign debt within the eurozone, subject to strict conditionality. It should lift the prohibition on deficit financing while ensuring that the federal debt is subject to limits comparable to those imposed on the states. In addition, the current unanimity rules for the decisions on own resources and the multi-annual financial framework must be modified.

A Deeper Legitimacy

Flexible and democratic procedures are needed for future treaty amendments, which should enter into force either once ratified by a qualified majority of the states and of Members of the European Parliament, or if carried in a pan-EU referendum by a majority of the states and citizens. Such changes will bring the EU into line with all other federal or international organisations.

EU states cannot be forced against their will to take the federal steps we here propose. At the same time, such states cannot be allowed an openended possibility to pick and choose what they want from the EU and discard the rest. Yet more *à la carte* opt-outs and derogations risk fracturing the cohesion of the *acquis communautaire*. Free-riding means disintegration. We therefore propose to create a new category of membership available to states which choose not to join the federal union. Institutional participation would necessarily be limited. Continued allegiance to the Union's values should be required, but political engagement in the Union's objectives and policies would be reduced. This new form of associate membership would also be an improvement on the present European Economic Area, and would be open to all other European countries. Should it prove impossible for all current member states to agree to revise the European Union along these lines, we urge the creation of a constituent assembly, gathering members of the national parliaments and the European Parliament to establish a constitution along these lines. Every parliament would be invited to participate in a fresh start for Europe but the assembly should be able to start its work even if not all have resolved to join such a project.



A Europe closer to its people!

We believe in Europe. As Europeans, we see our Plurality, Culture and the History of Democracy as unique Privileges and as a solid Basis for our Common Future. This is the time for a full direct Participation of the European Citizens as the next step to shape the Future and Unity of a Just and Democratic Europe. The European Federalist Party aims to provide a response to the inadequacies of the traditional political parties organized along national lines; it has been established to unite European Movements and Citizens to strive for a new European Social Contract within a true, transparent and fair European Federation. **Because Europe Matters! And so does your voice!**

Democracy and accountability: The European Federation should have one President elected directly by the European citizens. Parliament should consist of one chamber representing the citizens and another chamber representing the states.

European integration: The European Federation should be initiated from the creation of a federal core composed of EU Member States willing to make a step further in the process of European Integration.

Employment: A more integrated Europe will allow us to build on our strengths and skills and improve the competitiveness of our economy. This will in turn create more job opportunities, in particular for young people.

Increased integration will also help us ensure full mobility of the workforce within the Federation and to preserve the European social model.

Foreign and defence policy: The European Federation should be competent on issues such as foreign and defence policy. It should have one single army with a single central command, one single diplomatic corps, and a single seat at the United Nations Security Council, representing a common European foreign policy.

Security: A federal police should be put in place to deal with federal crimes (such as terrorism, organized crime, human traffic and federal taxes evasion). The European Federation should in particular be entitled to manage asylum policy and the control of external borders.

Public finances: The European Federation should have a European treasury. This treasury should manage a federal budget financed through federally attained resources (such as Eurobonds, European Transaction tax or others). Its currency should be the Euro. At the federal level, a more effective taxation system should be put in place to finance federal expenditure. This system should avoid tax

The European Federalist Party

*is a pan-European
political party striving
for a more democratic,
efficient and cohesive
Europe. [http://
federalistparty.eu/](http://federalistparty.eu/)*

duplications and favour economies of scale, thus reducing the overall tax burden on each European citizen.

Fiscal harmonization: The EFP will promote tax harmonisation to reduce social dumping and tax evasion within the Federation.

European Central Bank: The European Central Bank should be kept independent, but should get a double mandate of ensuring low inflation and economic growth together. The ECB should act as a lender of last resort.

European social model: The European Federation should protect the sustainability of the European social model and ensure that its citizens benefit from comparable civil, political, and economic rights and level of welfare, ensuring fair standards throughout the European Federation.

Solidarity: The EFP wants to reinforce the European Cohesion policy, focus on key Europe-wide infrastructure networks and a European social relief fund to improve territorial and social cohesion.

Justice: The role of the European Court of Justice should be reinforced as the heart of the federal judicial system. The second instance will remain in Luxembourg. The first instance should be strengthened by creating additional European federal courts of first instance at a local level, with at least one present in each member state.

Industrial policy: The European Federation should support European businesses operating in Europe and abroad with an effective federal industrial policy aimed at boosting innovation, increasing harmonisation of industrial rules and conditions across Europe and improving competitiveness.

Energy policy: The European Federation needs an energy policy that is sustainable and that effectively secures energy access throughout Europe.

Environment: The EFP believes that sustainable development is the basis for the future of European economic growth and considers environment as public good. The EFP will develop a complete strategy and a comprehensive environmental policy for the European Federation.

Research and Innovation is a primary source of economic

and social development, and should receive stronger support by the European Federation.

Culture: European culture consists of a rich multitude of local expressions that must be preserved and promoted as a unique treasure and as the common ground of our identity.

Education: The EFP supports the highest level of education for its citizens, encourages innovation and research and promotes European identity and European mobility through initiatives such as the Erasmus exchange programme and sports exchange programmes.

Language: The EFP aims to establish English as the vehicular language of the European Federation.

*(Adopted at the 2nd Convention
of the European Federalist Party
Rome, 4th November 2012)*

10 Steps towards the European Republic

The European Way¹ suggests 10 steps on how to strengthen civil society and democracy in Europe. They are aimed at creating a new public discourse, not bound by national, linguistic or cultural borders any longer. Because the national limitations of public debate and democratic decision making are the biggest obstacle to democracy, solidarity and freedom in a sustainable environment.

#1 The European Broadcasting Corporation

Publicly financed media is one of the most influential channels of information available to liberal societies. It defines the standard of information available to the general public and is often **limited to national events and horizons** today. In many member states public broadcasting companies are handicapped in their editorial choices by the government. Good public broadcasting, on the other hand, acts as guarantor for a dynamic, educated and fair public debate.

This demand is a central to build a European civil society. It can be easily implemented by merging the national resources already employed. It is time for a well-funded and politically **independent European Broadcasting Corporation** with a diverse programme and means of transmission (tv, radio, internet, publications). Good examples for exemplary public broadcasting and civil education can be found throughout Europe. We want an independent institution modelled after the British BBC, French-German ARTE, and the publications of the Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundesanstalt für Politische Bildung – bpb)

in Germany.

#2 'Global history and European society' as mandatory subject at school

The foundations to become a politically mature citizen are laid down at school. To date this precious potential is dreadfully wasted by teaching mainly national history without any European or global context. This limitation creates a **distorted view of historic causalities** and affects the capacity to understand present challenges and potentials. Thus it is not only historically incorrect, but actually a missed chance to educate and empower the next generation of global democrats.

We want our children to learn about **global connections and the dynamic character of history**. Almost no 'national' event can be really understood without learning what happened across the border at that same time. It is equally important to get over the national understanding of society, since this conception is as young as nationalism itself and not an absolute term throughout history.

#3 Reform of the electoral system for European Parliament

At the moment the European Parliament is elected through an uneven electoral process different in each member state of the Union. This creates **misrepresentation in parliament and weakens the democratic le-**

¹ www.europeanway.org

gitimacy of this most important institution of democracy. While financial and economic markets go beyond national borders of democratic decision making in every aspect, the most important institution to regulate still lacks the urgently needed power and legitimacy to oversee them.

Real democracy means **equal voting rights for every European citizen**. The decisions taken by this body have to be representative for the real needs and demands of its sovereign constituents. Only this way the European Parliament can become the strong and trusted institution necessary for deeper, sustainable and more equal common solution finding. There can not be full democracy at the European level, as long as the voter's will is expressed through national election systems.

#4 Campaign finance reform for European parties

If the European Parliament is not perfect, the parties running for seats are even bigger obstacles to a real European democracy. While competing for mandates, the centre of power is still on the national level and **the parties debate about national issues** consequently. Following this logic they campaign on national triggers and often try to portray themselves as guardians of national sovereignty, even when they actually are in favour of integration, according to their manifestos.

To solve this contradiction it is necessary to alter the national logic underlying their actions through economic incentives for federal parties. **A strong campaign finance system is key to independent politicians** working for the common good and not for special interests of influential donors. Long enough has European democracy been oppressed by the parties' liabilities towards national public and private sponsors.

#5 Democratic reform of the European Council and the Commission

Any democratic government responds to its head and depends from the approval of parliament. In case of the European Commission, effective government of the European Union, neither of these conditions for democratic control is met. The 28 Commissioners, one from each member state, are selected by and loyal to their own nationally ruling parties. **The Commission is not formed by the forces represented in the European Parliament**, but through compromises between the heads of state.

National governments, already represented through **the European Council, cannot be allowed to hold this kind of influence** over the composition of the European Commission. The current state perverts the logic of democratic oversight, compromises effective solutions and weakens the legitimacy of the Union altogether. To face the challenges of our time the European institutions will need to undergo **a reform process towards greater democratic coherence and transparency**.

#6 Chances for lifelong education

Any good political system is build upon a prosperous and dynamic civil society. Accordingly the money spend for individual education and skills will always pay off in terms of democratic empowerment. Tragically because of the financial crisis haunting European policy makers, **many educational systems were underfunded** in recent years. Not only is this unfair towards the disadvantaged people, but it also erodes the foundations on which freedom, democratic consensus, and solidarity are build upon.

Europe's biggest asset is the level of education and social engagement of its citizens. Hence education needs to be free, accessible and targeted for audiences of different ages, tongues and backgrounds. It should never be too late to **learn a new language, to engage in community work, or to invest in social skills**. The empowerment of citizens and the prosperity of democratic values are too important to condition them on economical constraints. Thanks to Digitalization it has never been so simple to spread information and to raise awareness for collective challenges and common grounds.

#7 Free access to culture and cultural institutions

There is no better way to understand your own heritage, then to experience it for yourself in a museum, theatre, or related cultural institution. Unfortunately it is difficult to appreciate the hidden value of culture at times, when 'value' is most likely to be understood as economical unit. But **dangerous thoughts fill the void left by the absence of civic culture** and unleash forces destructive to liberal values and democracy.

Europe is the continent of history and cultural heritage, where a thousand different languages, cultures and religions have met, coexisted and fought each other for

centuries. Having access to this rich melting pot is key to understanding the historic imperative and future advantages of the European peace project. To preserve Europe's cultural heritage is an effort to be made by the entire European community as part of the shared background and as cornerstone of European self-conception.

#8 European Agency for Cultural Exchange

Traveling the world opens up the mind and broadens the personal point of view. Living in a different part of Europe for a few months can help to **develop a shared sense of direction**. Many schools have already implemented some form pupil exchange and the Erasmus programme successfully does the same for students in higher education. Other organizations like scouts or binational youth exchange programmes work toward the same goal.

These efforts, central to foster intercultural understanding and tolerance, need to be coordinated and broadened up to a wider audience. In a job market shaped by dynamic and short living relationships the social and **welfare system needs to enable people to work abroad within the Union** at minimal costs and in an assisted manner. This way the emotional connection with Europe and the political institutions enabling this life changing experience will strengthen the visible advantages of the Union and the commitment of its citizens.

#9 New Social Deal

Economical and political prosperity are linked in many ways, some of them described here. **Civil society is most resistant to radicals when wealth is distributed equally among the people**. In a globalized world, where national decisions have consequences well beyond their own borders, this link between wealth and democracy is endangered by the national rationale itself. The nation as context of public solidarity is doomed to fail in providing a sustainable distribution of wealth, because of the competition inherent to nationalism.

Europe has to be the space of solidarity between people, no matter what colour their passport, and an example to the world. In order to save the European project, we must realize that being **European means to care for humanity and dignity without distinction**. We urgently need a federal welfare system, assimilated tax systems and higher taxes for returns on capital investments and big inheritances. Bailouts and large scale investments in depressed regions

will be absolutely essential to start a new cycle of hope, solidarity and cooperation in Europe.

#10 The federal European Republic

After World War II a vision united the founding mothers and fathers of the European project: **never again shall there be war on European soil**, never again shall people be sacrificed for the murderous ideology of violence and hatred embodied within fascism, the most radical form of nationalism. Human dignity shall be untouchable, freedom and solidarity the cornerstones of western society. However the postwar consensus of democracy and anti fascism is under attack for various partially self inflicted reasons discussed above.

The European identity is made of humanistic values. Non-violence and the overcoming of borders can bring together divided individuals and societies. The successful culmination of the European Way will be represented by a constitutional assembly of the federal European Republic. Following said principles **the European Republic cannot be thought as a super nation** and will be based on the democratic principles of subsidiarity, equality, solidarity and freedom.

Further explanations and position papers will address the implications of the Principle of Nonviolent Overcoming of Borders on the future strategies and institutional designs in Europe. Furthermore, possibilities of collective action and decentralized organization will be presented and the topics discussed above will be deeper investigated.

All the people fighting for humanity shall unite instead of being departed by egoism of any kind. This is The European Way!

A Continental Manifesto

No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as any manner of thy friends or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind. And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

JOHN DONN, 1624

Disunited Europe, dependent Europe

Mankind is growing aware of the Earth's finiteness gradually. Europeans don't rule the world any longer. And that's good. But, their continent, Europe, for lack of unity, is not even able to contribute positively to world governance. That void of power throws relations between continent-wide states out of balance. Since WWII, the USA was never able to solve an international crisis on its own.

Russia has not stopped thinking of itself as an empire. Only China is able to dispute the old cold war balance of power. And it is difficult to stabilise a new balance without a united Europe.

The multitude of extreme phenomena – climate change, bio-diversity collapse, explosion of inequalities – are a clear sign of the unsustainability of the growth regime inherited from the European industrial revolution. They signify the Earth's depleted state under the joint effects of productivism, extractivism and consumerism of metals and fossil carbon.

Oil- and gas-producing rentier states harbour illusions of omnipotence. Without a

common European energy policy, addiction to fossil fuels has made national energy policies subservient to Middle Eastern and Eurasian autocrats. In the interim, European nation states decided to relinquish their sovereign right to finance deficits or long-run investments through free advances from central banks to treasuries. Ever-growing interest accrued to private banks (the only lenders left), and public indebtedness skyrocketed. So-called "sovereign debt" made national economic and social policies subservient in their turn to the rules and preferences of market finance.

Those twin-dependencies, on both energy and finance, of the disunited nation states of Europe are condemning public policies to an inexorably growing impoverishment, whether their purpose is investment or redistribution. They are a prelude to the extreme hopelessness of rural or derelict areas left behind by manufacturing, while the digital revolution and robots are destroying waged employment massively, and precarity is soaring.

*Europe
must
federate
or perish*

CLEMENT
ATLEE, 1939

A little bit of history to understand better

To talk about energy and finance disunity is puzzling, given that the beginnings of the EU date back to the pooling of coal and steel production (Paris Treaty, 1951), then of civil atom (Euratom, 1957). And its most recent outcome, which nobody ignores, is a single currency (1999), circulated in 19 Member States. However, **disunity results from France's successive refusals to take any decisive step towards political unity.** The **first refusal** (1954) dismissed the Political Community with the European Defence Community (the second Paris Treaty, 1952). The EDC was yet, just as ECSC and Euratom, a French initiative. That U-turn surprised and disappointed the five partners of France.

The **second French refusal** opposed a proposal from the Commission including a federal budget (1965). The **third** and **fourth** ones were tacit **rejections of German proposals** to create a first nucleus of a political union (1994) or a federation (2000), the **fifth** one was the negative referendum (2005) about a controversial "constitutional" treaty. While opening the door to parliamentary democracy a bit wider, it locked monetary and economic policies into monetarism and laissez-faire, drifting integration once more away from the founding treaties. Those political biases deprive the Union of any discretion to decide policies and levy autonomous resources on its own. Such discretion was to be missed as soon as a crisis occurred (2008).

Integration has never been more than a long-lasting try at giving Europe the color and taste of unity, without federating it, that is, without addressing the sovereignty issue head on, or in other words without limiting the sovereignty of Member States in favour of a common, limited but real, sovereignty. Member States of the EU stay "sovereign", but that sovereignty of theirs is a dummy one, since they abdicated its reality to foreign or financial powers. **Governments and the Union fooled the public into dangerous beliefs:** (i) that bureaucratic and economic integration would produce a psychological one gradually, and (ii) that integration, making Europeans as well as one Europe, would pave the way to a United States of Europe, as in Victor Hugo's dreams, or the founders' thoughts and wishes. – This to happen later on, always beyond the end of the current term of governments in power.

Disunited Europe, unprepared Europe

European integration worked well as an interdependence accelerator, but governments have a mandate to govern nation states, not to let Europe as a whole decide and act as a manager of that growing interdependence, especially if things go wrong. Europeans were not prepared to face danger as one people. When the Georgian, financial, Ukrainian, migratory and terrorist crises occurred, Europe was not ready. Those crises seem to have nothing in common. But, in all cases, **the EU couldn't protect itself, in the face of adversity: the crises exposed the Union's incompleteness.**

The Georgian crisis and, even more so, the Ukrainian one, proved that Disunited States of Europe, even nuclear-armed ones, neither deter a powerful neighbour from attacking a weaker one, nor weigh on NATO decisions or US diplomacy in the best interests of Europeans. Energy dependency on the aggressor is a decisive factor of Europe's collective weakness. The eirenic vision of a post-modern Europe, sheltered from war, armed with soft power and excused from hard power responsibilities, is a legacy of liberal internationalism, according to which free trade cures states of *l'esprit de conquête* (the spirit of conquest) and imperialism. A fateful mistake!

A free Europe will be an energy self-sufficient Europe, setting up balanced relationships with the Arab world and Russia. Those regions will make the most of their huge human potential only when they emerge from their current rent economies. A free Europe will be a Europe demonstrating a collective willingness to provide for its own security, and its neighbourhood's as well, through the building up of a common armed force. And, if need be, as a successor to the French nuclear arsenal, a Europe able to protect its territory, and guarantee its integrity without depending on anyone else and to have a seat at the table in order to achieve a world without nuclear arms. All those developments require unity of decision and accountability, as well as negotiating and commanding power that are badly needed in an unfinished Europe.

Emperors have no clothes

The financial crisis, which came from the USA, shed light on the lack of completion of the monetary union. Without an autonomous tax-and-spend power, the euro area is locked in a straightjacket of "gov-

ernance by rules", negotiated behind closed doors and imposed on common institutions and national parliaments. As a result, the latter were changed to rubber-stamping houses. No fiscal autonomy of the euro area means no common discretionary policy and, on the contrary, resurgence of "national interests", with Germany's in first place. It would be naive to think that a national interest is the one of a "nation" or a "people", while it is a matter of shared interests, especially in France and Germany, of a country's political class and big corporations, in banking and manufacturing.

Rebukes from France to Germany at the turn of the century were too much even for the "European Germany" that was, and neighbours have reaped the sour fruit of a "German Europe". Berlin has built a huge competitive advantage through a negotiated decrease in wages (2000), the deflationary effects of which in the euro area differ little from those of a devaluation under a fixed exchange rate regime. For ideological motives, the German government didn't stimulate demand through public spending, which would have needed a fiscal debt-increasing deficit. They did it by taking market share away from their neighbours. Whether the effects of that corporatist mercantilism were intentional or not, they should make Berlin think twice before boasting about their performance in response to the crisis. If other governments of the euro area had the little courage needed to respond, they should say Germany's current relative prosperity is the product of a theft. Just a little honesty would result in acknowledgement that Berlin had no other choice left, in a Europe of competition between states, to which all of them subscribed and from which they banned solidarity.

On the contrary, those governments are trying, through a reckless imitation of their "German model", to decrease its new competitive advantage, waging against each other a race to the bottom, namely **a competitive deflation**. That unbridled competition between their respective wage, tax and welfare regimes distorts competition between firms, with the same effects on the real economy as **competitive devaluations** in the inter-war period or **competitive disinflation** under the European Monetary System (1979-1999). In that competition between States, the euro area countries have no chance of winning back trade surpluses, unless they rush austerity policies or Germany sets its wages higher again. However, the patent distortions of competition between firms did not preclude governments to renew their commitment to prevent them (Lisbon Treaty, 2009). This is the height of hypocrisy!

Since the financial crisis and the joint bailout of toxic teams of indebted governments and lending banks, there was no lack of decisions, but they came too late and, in the end, they were not enough (European Systemic Risk Board, 2009; European Financial Stability Facility, 2010 and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, 2011-13; European Stability Mechanism and European Fiscal Compact, 2012; sovereign debt buy-back by the ECB on secondary markets, 2012; ECB quantitative easing, 2015). They were all outcomes of a plethora of so-called "last chance" European Council meetings. But, Member States never threw off the yoke of the creditor banks maintaining their dependence. They never got rid of the dogma they subscribed to in the wake of Germany: governments' budgets have to be managed just as the Swabian housewife's or a Midlands grocery's ones.

Emperors are afraid

The reason why is simple: no government willingly accepts that its peers (even more so a federal power) should interfere in the opaque relations between power and money. None can take the risk of spotlighting that connivance. None will recognize years of wrongs made for the sake of a pseudo-science postulating the unlimited rationality of economic agents, neutrality of money and self-regulation of markets. This results in precluding public authorities from serving the public interest decently. None will admit, after denying it, that what matters is not the volume of debt but its sustainability, i.e. the ability to repay loans, namely the discounted sum of expected budgets surpluses, except interest, which would allow to a decrease in indebtedness.

Member States are not afraid of the follow-up to be given to a monetary union in itself, as is needed to solve the debt crisis and to govern the euro area economy. A banking union, and a fiscal union, were both proposed in time by the European Commission. They are afraid of the gross unveiling of their own practices, and the total overhaul and consolidation, triggered by **the creation of a Federal Treasury**. By the way, that administration would stay without legitimacy, then without authority, unless it is included in **a full common system of federal government, constitutional, democratic and sovereign**. A citizens' claim for a separation of European powers between them, of European from national ones, the containment of national oligarchies, a claim for transparency by Nordic standards, the fight against evasion, fraud, corruption and once abolished but

endlessly restored privileges, would scare governments. That's why political parties are nurturing a fear of Europe in the public opinion, intentionally or not.

The stolen dream: integration dynamics

The history of European integration can be analysed as two overlapping dynamics:

THE FIRST ONE IS POLITICAL: its starting point was a major innovation in international relations, a process supposed to lead from a system of sovereign states to a federal state, according to an original method of cooperation requiring common institutions and a common purpose. That method was named "community method" after the "Communities" (ECSC, 1951 and EEC, 1957). The institutions entrusted with the administration of successive stages in the process were assumed to prefigure the federation, to which Member States would make their way. That specific cooperation was gradually cut to a quasi-permanent negotiation, because France, more and more mimicked by its partners, required unanimous decisions in the Council. Exposed at all times, after de Gaulle and since Thatcher, to the veto of a Member State, negotiations came closer and closer to the usual practice of multilateral organisations. In 2000, Germany offered to federate with its partners, and France ignored the proposal, while the euro made political union necessary. The French rebuff could be interpreted as a total reversal of the original intent of French diplomacy, as expressed in 1950.

THE SECOND DYNAMIC IS ECONOMIC and is about the integration framework, first the West's, then the world's: the European Community was invented within an international monetary system that sheltered Europe from exchange rate instability and excused it from monetary union, while growth provided for full employment, and the Welfare State for social peace. Undermined by the destabilization of that system (1971), monetary stability was restored only after the long journey to the euro, while unemployment and precarity were creeping up, until the financial crisis led the whole European continent into a depression, then stagnation. Keynesian and Rooseveltian multilateralism gave way to a wild Hayekian and Thatcherite rush towards privatisation

and deregulation, then, in Germany, at the heart of the Euro area, to Berlin's corporatist mercantilism, imposing austerity on partners, against the European preference for economic, social and territorial cohesion.

Member States took the Union away from the peoples, while national political parties were losing their citizens' trust. Given that the Union displays, unconvincingly, a mixed record on the side of efficiency and equity, it struggles to regain legitimacy on the side of democracy, and fails. This is reflected in the lack of interest of citizens in European elections.

The dream came with words, but action has not followed. Governments kept promising, shirking their duty of unity. Facing new risks, peoples and political élites are in moral panic. Communication has been cut between voters and elected representatives to the benefit of internal and external enemies of the open society.

Voting without a choice

Always anxious about regaining their lost glory or legitimacy, nation states never miss an opportunity to remind the public that they are the masters of the treaties. That discreet veil of legalism shows a will to cover up the hard truth of a Europe in crisis: creditors are the masters of inter-state compromises. Decisions, taken too late, are nothing other than agreements without an ambition, last minute deals, concluded with the sole concern of the national public perception. The community of situation of European citizens and peoples is deliberately obliterated from their minds in favor of fake differences, keeping alive envy or resentment and leading, in some places, to humiliation and hatred. Member States, as parties to the compromise, are legally equal before the law, but not in fact: creditors and net contributors are more equal than others. But all are constrained by the private banking system, as the sole beneficiary of base money creation, when needed, since governments denied themselves the right to access it.

Then, political parties invited themselves to this picture: the inter-state compromises are based on a consensus among the conservative and progressive parties that governments are coming from. Most of the time, at the end of the negotiation, both sides are dissatisfied with the balance point. And then, negotiators boast about having reached the right compromise. Although they do their best to claim they have won the battle, which may flatter chauvinism,

they are soon disappointed. As a matter of fact, right-wing voters realise at once that the compromise is too leftist for them, while left-wing voters find it too rightist, while both see it as a surrender to the lending banks. In all cases, the balance point is not true to pre-election promises, which brings politicians into disrepute, and their mandates are not renewed. Voters then notice that the next government is still a prisoner of that compromise or new similar ones. They voted on written manifestos, but they had no choice actually, because an unwritten agenda, including all past and future compromises between governments, forced upon weak states by their powerful creditors, prevails in the end.

That non-choice fixes European society into a narrow conservatism, without any collective ambition. Europe is lagging behind North America and Australasia. Many Europeans feel downgraded, while inequalities are increasing inexorably, generating multiple frustrations, on the side of the most needy as well as the most innovative. Intensified by the crisis of the euro area, this phenomenon is not a recent one. But, until the crisis, governments contained it either through step-by-step tactics, or placing their feet in the Founders' footsteps, each time a step forward did not affect privileges of the political élites, such as the extension of free movement to everyone – from workers to all European residents – or the creation of a central bank. After all, custom officials or border policemen are just civil servants, central banks are government agencies and their governors are not elected representatives.

Unfinished Europe, procrastinated Europe

Europe-building has been brought to a halt since the creation of the euro, because governments are reluctant to establish a common discretionary power in the field of economic policy. Planning a partial abdication of the national tax-and-spend power by finance ministers and parliaments would not only question the status of obscure civil servants, but also the relevance of national political mandates. Not only jobs are at risk, but the privileges of oligarchs as well.

There is evidence of that risk. All definite actions to be taken until reaching the stage of a fiscal union in the euro area are depending on preconditions, namely: a revision of the treaties or constitutional reforms with institutional hurdles; or the tidying-up of public affairs in Member States; or a change in public policies or even governments to bring

them back in line with the prevailing economic doctrine. That is to say, the defense of the status quo or, in other words, of national economic rents, always prevail on the common interest of Europeans, even in the face of adversity.

Political reforms became popular with liberalism in the 18th century and the social question in the 19th century: they were radical changes aimed at more perfect institutions, in the interest of the people at large or the weakest. Quite the contrary, in the European Council's "newspeak", "reforms" are stealth changes to keep to "rules", set in favour of the most powerful and the richest, whose interest is assumed to be identical to the general interest. For European citizens, things just don't change any longer, the less so through "reforms".

Another cause of the do-nothing attitude is governments' propensity to postpone decisions beyond the next election. The most necessary and urgent decisions are now hot potatoes which a government is never willing to take itself, but rather wants to pass onto the next one. **It is amazing to note what governments can do after the next election that they didn't do before it.** An old variation of this scenario is to make that decision dependent, not on one's own reelection, but on a sister party coming to power in another Member State. It is as if completing the union should wait until all governments in power at the same time belong to the same political family or convey the same economic doctrine.

Also, decision-makers in governments or companies are imprisoned; the former by their powerless sovereignties, the latter by the excesses of shareholder capitalism or markets volatility, in shorter and shorter time limits. Those time horizons run from, at best, an elective term of office to a few hours before the bursting of a speculative stock-market bubble, discouraging any prospective analysis, any medium-term budgeting and programming, any long-term vision. In their turn, spatial horizons, larger and larger, continent- or world-wide, leave national decision-makers in an inferior position with respect to continent-wide states, transnational giants in extractive or digital industries, or even multilateral organisations. All of those larger decision-makers are inclined to set down secret rules, out of the scope of democratic scrutiny, made public as it happens by whistle-blowers and decrypted by a precious few analysts. That is what a central bank governor called the **"tragedy of horizons"**.

If national politicians do not want to dig Europe's grave, they have to recognise sooner or later that prerequisites

or delays or short-termism or sovereigntism, when facing emergency or adversity, must be banned once and for all from governmental practice. **If European citizens do not want to preclude themselves from inventing their future, they must recognise, sooner or later, that national, regional and local democracy will stay vulnerable to any aggression by its enemies. Safety requires the strong shield of a powerful federation, whatever its size, continental or sub-continental, as an essential prerequisite to any change in social or public affairs.**

Unfinished Europe, vulnerable Europe

The 2015 migrants crisis and terrorists attacks on January 7, 8 and 9 and November 13 exposed that vulnerability for all the world to see. Immigration and asylum policies are always and everywhere tightrope policies, between the universal principle of non-discrimination and the majority view, altruism and egoism, recognition of “the other” and self-idolatry, empathy and mutual misunderstanding, sharing and greed, cultural interbreeding and identical reproduction of the social fabric, freedom to come and go and internal passports. But the European Union is trapped in a unique contradiction. It bases European citizenship and its citizens’ freedom of movement on the non-discrimination principle on grounds of national origin while leaving most of the control of its external borders, and the financial cost of that, to the sole border countries, notably impoverished and austerity-torn Greece. That inequity is unbearable, the more so because today refugees are a harbinger of climate migrants. The European Union should expect more migrants, not fewer.

No society can be totally safe from attacks, whatever their origin. Terrorism can’t be totally eradicated. It has to be managed. An approach focused on security is not enough. But, in the European Union everything becomes more difficult if that management is left to Member States, citing their sovereignty, while their know-how in the field of intelligence and police varies greatly with respect to their history and size, and cooperation between services has failed. Not all Member States have been equally exposed to insecurity or subversion in the past, but all have in common the illusion that they are able to deal with terror in isolation.

In the European Union, every individual has a right to freedom and security. The migrant crisis is a threat to our cherished freedom and terror is a threat to security, which

is a fundamental right under the rule of law. It is clear that citizens in Europe are developing a sense of a common situation, calling for a common government. And the answer is nothing less than a state, the primary purposes of which are freedom and security, as Hobbes and Spinoza explained. A **federal coastguard** acts naturally under the control of a Ministry of Home Affairs, **coastguard units** belong to a Federal Navy, terror acts inside the Union’s territory are a Federal Police issue, they trigger a demand for sharing collected data over the whole Union, hence the need for **a Federal Intelligence Service**, and, outside the Union, a projection and operational capability, which means in its turn **a common armed force**. But the political will to progress deliberately along those lines, and to give the Union the wanted own resources, is missing.

Politics of fear

It must be made clear that **if the EU is unable to deal with those issues in a Community way**, even if the Treaties makes it mandatory for them, the right to move freely in Europe will be repealed, first by these Member States where the politics of fear will have triumphed, then all over Europe, because the Union will disintegrate. In Europe will coexist, in mutual suspicion at first, then in hostility, national fortresses where, from a state of emergency to a state of siege, democracy itself will be repealed and Europeans will experience “guided democracy” and “illiberal regimes”. **This will inaugurate an era of decay.**

If the European crew limits itself to bail water out, or to seal the leaks, with several meetings of 28 Heads of Government taking place each month, without giving powers and resources similar to those of the USA Administration and Congress to the Union’s common institutions, then Member States will keep on passing Europeans off as reckless amateurs, waiting for destiny or compassionate allies or forgiving enemies to protect their freedom and security. The vessel will take on water, and it will sink. It is just a matter of time: the politics of fear will have triumphed anyway. Walls and barbed wire will partition the continent again.

If powers and resources are not given for freedom and security, why would they be for the energy transition or the completion of monetary union? Middle classes were victims of austerity policies, designed by Member States’ creditors under the infamous Washington consensus. They are and will be victims of the stagnation that those policies led to. Sooner or later, they will realise that they took too much of

a risk, either by meeting the TINA (“there is no alternative”) principle, without having to agree knowingly to it, or by trying to “upturn the table” at the invitation of demagogues.

Political scientists of European integration have noticed long ago the emergence of an alliance between intergovernmentalism (national sovereigntism) and neo-liberalism (the deregulation dogma). Under the alliance’s rule, national politics came down to a mere market where polls, almost always national ones, are supposed to express the political demand, and where national political agendas, assumed to satisfy the revealed national preferences, are supplied to national voters, downgraded to passive consumers. Intergovernmentalism is just a comfortable habit (as seen by naive people) or a cynical trick (as seen by smarter people) to limit that political supply to only one policy. The only one available is the one defined by consensus among a majority of governments supporting the dogma, with the huge advantage of protecting established positions in the national political and media spheres.

TINA destroyed trust in mainstream parties and yesterday’s politics, identified as they are with globalisation and “Brussels”. It paved the way to success for democratic candidates against austerity (the radical left) or national-capitalist ones against democracy (neo-fascism). “Extreme-centre” politicians, from the less social-minded liberals to the more laissez-faire-minded socialists, made a choice to humiliate democracy. In so doing, they succeeded in maintaining the status quo and saving banks (that is how Greece has been dealt with), but they were challenged to expose, in full public view, the secret (post-democratic) working of the euro-group. They even went as far as pre-empting the extreme-right agenda, anticipating its implementation (pre-fascism), as it happened in France. Only radically democratic politics and economics, in all areas of public life on a continental scale, or at least in a first federal core, can cure Europeans of fear.

Politics of hope

A democratic transformation of Europe is already happening, alongside the rising tide of nationalism, xenophobia, racism and intolerance. In the end, all of those have the same ideological matrix: the exclusive nation. Democratic transformation will not succeed in a Europe of absolutely sovereign states, a Europe of the European Council or the euro-group. Whereas national governments have already trampled democratic rights, or are tempted to, only a federal constitution can **guarantee**

national constitutional **guarantees** to citizens and peoples in the end. If not, what would be the remedy for a citizen deprived of his rights by his Member State of origin or residence? For that “**guarantee of guarantees**” (René Cassin) to be given, “sovereign” states have to make way to “member” states. They cannot pretend any longer to a monopoly of public authority.

For that democratic transformation of Europe not to be confined within borders, it has to cross them, and feed itself from all current or planned citizens’ practices. It has to be transnational. For sure, nothing precludes anybody from addressing governments with prayers, without believing too much that they will be heard. The prayers would ask for their European action not to be dependent any longer on arbitrary rules and their denial of global realities. A mere vote in the Council and the Parliament would be enough to overcome their reluctance to move forward, if only the minority was willing to defer to the majority. But why would national governments or parties show today, when catastrophes are threatening, a courage they did not show in quieter times? They inherited and own common assets. Why do they not use them? Worse, why do they squander them? **Citizens, cities, and companies must carry out that transformation, bottom to top, without waiting for anything from governments or political parties**, but by putting them under increasing pressure, to the point where they cannot contain it any longer.

Hope must be reborn. Hope can be reborn. It is enough to remember the circumstances in which plans for a free and united Europe were drawn up: under the boots of occupying powers, in hiding under totalitarian regimes, in gaols and camps, in the Resistance Maquis and networks. Are our rulers, representatives, and the rich and the powerful all over Europe, not ridiculous to shy away from getting out of their respective comfort zones and address the 21st century issues? Do they not deserve our contempt for believing that laissez-faire and laissez-passer, quantitative growth and waged employment are universal answers to our fears, and the threats to the future of mankind?

However, aren’t we, ordinary citizens, just as guilty as they are, of indifference to the fate of future generations, our own children and grand-children? Aren’t we wrong to distrust politics and democracy, while counting on the old demons of national or religious discrimination to deal with our suffering, instead of mobilising our energies in support of free participation, from communities or neighbourhoods where we are living, to the continent, which is our commons.

A United Pact for Europe

Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats.

Nous unissons des hommes.

JEAN MONNET, 1952

The time has come to proclaim that the European dream is more than a market, that **Europe is a plan to add a common wellness without denying diversity**. It is up to the peoples and citizens of Europe to take back from Member States a sovereignty they usurped since they proved their failure in the face of adversity, and to redistribute sovereign powers between Member States and common institutions. The time has come to understand that **a federation doesn't federate states only, but citizens in the first place, as citizens of the states – peoples of the states – and as citizens of the federation – a federal people**. Citizens in a federation are citizens twice. The federation is a plan for a political community based on a founding principle, stated after the experience of Nazism, **the principle of non-discrimination**. This principle outlaws all discriminations, whether they are of origin, of religion, of gender, or of nationality as well. It then addresses the very discrimination that underpins the closing of the nation state and the division of Europe.

At the origin of the extreme-right progression is a lack of social and cultural inclusion. Those votes are proof that the agenda of parties fomenting exclusion is keeping pace with an existential crisis of national societies. Their presence all over Europe is a paradoxical demonstration, if still needed, of the existence of a European society, already transnational. Those parties, in the quest of an illusory “purity” are preaching the exclusion of “those who are different”, asserting the supremacy of nationals over foreigners and practitioners of one religion over those of another, wanting to close borders against the right to asylum and the duty of hospitality, planning to reconsider gender equality. And that short list is not exhaustive.

Therefore, it is the non-discrimination principle, as stated by the European Convention of Human Rights and confirmed in the EU by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, that can found the politics of hope. Citizens and networks, representative organisations of civil society, not contaminated by the ideology of exclusion, can work up together a **European Civil Pact** for equal rights, political equality, just as resistance fighters or post-war constituents did, to spare Europe new nightmares.

Parties and social partners could be invited to subscribe

in each and every Member State a transpartisan Republican (or United) Pact for Europe, valid until the constitution of the federation, to leave a range of actions out of business-as-usual, namely electoral competition between mainstream parties and collective bargaining between social partners. The Pacts should include a social contract, an economic New Deal and a political constitution:

1. The social contract aims at fighting inequality and precarity while mitigating the collateral damage of austerity policies in the euro area. Competitive deflation is pitting Member States and peoples against each other in a race to the bottom of wage, tax and welfare regimes, at a time when full employment has become an inaccessible goal. On the contrary, European citizens should be given a clear sense of belonging to a cohesive community beyond Member States, a continental social body. To that end, an unconditional basic income for all should be instituted as a new “continental commons”, partly separating households’ resources from wage-earning jobs, and guaranteeing equality before hazards of life to all Europeans. That new expenditure would be covered by a (financial) transactions tax.

2. The New Deal for Europe (NewDeal4Europe) is a transnational policy commitment to energy frugality and jobs creation through both the transition to renewables and the power autonomy of housing. It assigns sustainable development to research and innovation as their priority aim. The New Deal, contributing heavily to the emergence of a European consciousness, requires (i) the prior creation of federal financial agencies to complete monetary union, (ii) the institution, without delay, of a carbon value – as another “continental commons” – and (iii) a European strategic network of industrial projects opened to competing firms without distortion from the stupid competition between Member States.

3. The constitution, through democratic and peaceful means, bottom to top, according to a participative method, of a *res publica europae* – a United States of Europe. Revisions of Member States constitutions would follow, sooner or later, including the federalisation of unitary centralized states, with the prime concern to protect European citizens from the nasty consequences of professional politics. Trust in public institutions would then be restored across the continent.

Those commitments and constitutions are the main specification for the construction site to be opened by sealing Europe Civil Pact and Republican or United Pacts for Europe, and convening local constituents based on citizens' initiatives. This Continental Manifesto aims at striking up a public conversation: how to involve citizens in a constitutional process, then in the governance of public affairs? How is it possible, for all Europeans, to live a decent life together? How to bridge the gap between the moral narrative and real practices while rethinking the firm and the state? That is the way out of the crisis, to prevent the next one, to save the planet, to fix Europe and democracy, to return to the principles of the European Enlightenment, the "good life" and the "commons".

Epilogue

Soyons la même République, soyons les Etats-Unis d'Europe, soyons la fédération continentale.

VICTOR HUGO

Europe can't serve mankind without being a cosmopolitical republic for Europeans as well as for others. Any other perspective is fatal. A Europe that would not be up to its own humanism and Enlightenment would be engulfed by barbarity and obscurantism.

The only available answer is openness to all those who have already experienced bombs, lethal gas, and rape, i.e.

horror, and still have enough courage to defy death and seek refuge on a continent they see as an eldorado.

A closed society, whether by walls or by ignorance, is suicidal. It pretends to stop time. To freeze Europe as it is now, is tantamount to programming its death.

The Europe of nation states is locked in a long-lasting stagnation. It is self-destroying. It gives to its residents of today, including refugees, only one prospect: sharing in penury and fear of tomorrow.

Zero carbon, distributed energy, the Internet of Things, circular economics, the unconditional basic income: all those innovations are drawing up a single vision for our continent, for its neighbours and the planet. The crisis of rural areas and the urban malaise have to be examined in the light of it.

That vision is one of a construction site and a garden: the construction site of energy self-sufficiency of each and every home, the garden of a fixed nature and a species reconciled with its habitat.

The path to hope is a metamorphosis of Europe. Europeans must leave the 20th century, at last. Europeans must stop navel gazing. Past national glories will not come back.

Together, we must invent an open democracy (with humility), a sustainable and equitable model. There is no other way to silence the hate mongers: federate Europe to open the construction site and grow the garden. The time has come – it is overdue – to institute the Republic of Europe.

*The author is **Bernard Barthalay**. "A Continental Manifesto" results from a conversation established years ago with his friends of Puissance Europe/Weltmacht Europa (PE/WE), a transnational network of initiatives founded by a handful of long-haul European federalists, and on social networks as well, especially on his personal Facebook page, and on the PE/WE and the United States of Europe ones. It is less the text of an author than the expression of a strong common understanding between individuals learning to debate together about the future of Europe from a finding that Spinelli made already in the fifties: national governments usurped the role of a European government, which is not theirs, without any explicit popular mandate. The system of sovereign states (the European Council and the euro-group) is still there.*

DR. REBECA
PÉREZ LEÓN

A Defence of Richard Rorty's Liberal Ironist

Rorty defines private irony as the work where the individual recognises the contingency of her¹ own vocabulary, whereas the liberal public is the work of solidarity, i.e., of forming community bonds with others and exercising our moral commitments². The liberal ironist is someone who is able to join her work of recognising contingency and her moral practices and commitments to liberalism. Critics of Rorty's liberal ironist, however, argue that this is an impossible figure because the private light-mindedness and relativism of the ironist makes it impossible for her to have moral or public commitments, especially the moral commitments of liberalism.

Rorty's critics find their evidence in one of Rorty's most problematic descriptions of the ironist:

"I call people of this sort 'ironist' because their realisation that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed and their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria of choice between final vocabulary puts them in the position which Sartre called 'meta-stable': never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies and thus of their selves"³

First, the ironist is a relativist because she does not believe that there are ultimate reasons to justify one's beliefs and systems of beliefs⁴. By the same token, there is no reason why she should respect liberal commitments⁵. It is simply not rational to behave according to beliefs, which we have no reasons to justify or at least reasons to think they are better

than their alternatives. Second, insofar as the ironist does not justify her beliefs and practices, she must rely on force, rhetoric, intelligence, sophistication or power to propose and impose her beliefs⁶. Third, the ironist has a "loathsome"⁷ moral stance if she thinks that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed. This belief leads the ironist to duplicity⁸ because she will be inclined to lie or change stories, and to cruelty because she does not care how people who survived horrific evils will feel by her redescriptions that make horrific evils look good⁹. Thus, the ironist would be betraying the liberal principles of open, truthful justification and avoidance of cruelty, respectively.

In what follows, I will respond to each criticism by questioning their common premise, namely, that the recognition of contingency leaves the ironist without any fulcrum with which to justify her beliefs either in public or private. I will argue that the ironist recognition of contingency is not only compatible with a commitment to liberalism; it could actually strengthen liberal democracy.

The criticisms above conflate philosophical foundations and rational justification. They suggest that if one dispenses with the former, one also does so with the latter. This is not so. The liberal ironist certainly rejects philosophical seriousness, i.e., she rejects to treat her language and liberal democracy as 'if they were expressions of human nature, soul or essence'¹⁰. What this rejection means, however, is the ironist's recognition that she "has no noncircular argumentative recourse"¹¹ when pressed to justify her beliefs. She can only justify her practices and beliefs self-referentially, i.e.,

1 I kept Rorty's reference to the ironist as a 'she'.

2 Cf. Rorty, Richard (1989) "Private Irony and Liberal Hope" in *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 83. Hereafter cited as PILH

3 Ibid.

4 Cf. Bernstein, Richard J. ("Rorty's Liberal Utopia", *Social Research*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Philosophy and Politics II. Spring, p. 46f, 57. Hereafter cited as RLU.

5 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 46, 52, 58.

6 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 60, 71

7 Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1992) "Don't Be Cruel: Reflections on Rortian Liberalism" in Daniel W. Conway and John E. Seery (eds.) *The Politics of Irony. Essays in Self-Betrayal*. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 207. Hereafter cited as DBC.

8 Cf. Bernstein, RLU, p. 62

9 Cf. Elshtain, DBC, p. 207.

10 Cf. Rorty, PILH, p. 73.


11 Ibid.

by reference to her other practices and beliefs. Even when she doubts her own reasons, or experiments with other languages, or redescribes, her starting point is her current beliefs. Indeed, the very scenario of having no reasons at all for holding beliefs or system of beliefs is impossible for a linguistic user. On Rorty's holistic view, to use language "is being 'in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says'"¹². Thus, unless the ironist loses her ability to use language, the rejection to give ultimate reasons cannot mean an inability to give reasons full stop. On the contrary, the recognition of contingency involves as its first moment the recognition of, and engagement in, the self-referential work of language and justification.

The self-referentiality of language and justification should not suggest the idea of the incommensurability of languages, i.e., that members of different linguistic communities are stuck within their own languages and are, thus, unable to understand each other. It should suggest, rather, that significations are *not* produced by appeal to something external, but rather internally, through differentiations. These differentiations (like meeting someone with a very different cultural background) produce new significations. Such productivity suggests that although two members of a different linguistic community will not exchange reasons at first, insofar as they are language users they will be able to interpret the other and eventually get the knack of what the other is saying¹³. Thus, the ironist's recognition that there are no neutral reasons between vocabularies is not an invitation to use force and manipulation. For Rorty, it invites the ironist to expand her acquaintance with other languages "not just for her own edification, but in order to understand the actual and possible humiliation"¹⁴ of people who have different cultural backgrounds to hers.

The ironist describes the productivity or auto-poiesis of language, which is the second moment in her recognition of contingency, as the 'realisation that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed'. Indeed, that words can swing free from any context and still be significant bespeaks the auto-poietic operation of language. However, Rorty's critics have interpreted this phrase as an indication of Rorty's endorsement of duplicity and cruelty. This is an

uncharitable interpretation, but it does indicate the main element in the critics' rejection of the ironist's recognition of contingency. This element is the fear that liberal practices will not survive without philosophical seriousness. First, although Rorty cannot seriously think there is guarantee against the destruction of democracy, he thinks democracy would not only survive irony; it could actually be strengthened by it. For Rorty, philosophical seriousness has become an impediment to the further development of democracy¹⁵, because treating democracy as the *intrinsically* good or rational form of government is often accompanied by a disposition to treat other forms of government and social organisation as *intrinsically* bad or irrational. Irony tons down our 'moral robustness'¹⁶ just enough to make us open enough to listen to others and respect other forms of social organisation and traditions. Second, as a pragmatist Rorty suggests valuing liberal democratic practices by the good and bad they seem to be doing rather than by the presupposed philosophical foundations they might have¹⁷. Rorty says, "we shall lose what Nietzsche called 'metaphysical comfort', but we may gain a renewed sense of community"¹⁸ because insofar as the burden of justification is transposed from extra-linguistic entities to intra-communitarian practices and beliefs, the members of the community will be able see themselves as dependent upon, and responsible to, others and *only* to others.



12 Rorty, Richard (1979) *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 182. Hereafter cited as PMN.

13 Cf. Rorty, Richard (1991) *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Philosophical Papers Volume I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, p. 107f

14 Rorty, PILH, p. 91f.

15 Rorty, Richard (1998) "John Searle on Realism and Relativism" in *Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers Vol. IV*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 66. Hereafter cited as SRR

16 Rorty, Richard (1992) "Robustness: A Reply to Jean Bathke Elshtain" in Daniel W. Conway and John E. Seery (eds.) *The Politics of Irony: Essays on Self-Betrayal*. New York: St. Martins Press, p.p. 219-223.

17 Rorty, SRR, p. 66.

18 Rorty, Richard (2000) "Response to Conant" in Robert Brandom (ed.) *Rorty and his critics*. Oxford Blackwell Publishing, p. 347.

OLYMPIOS RAPTIS

Brexit or not, it's the statism, stupid!

There is widespread belief that following the recent UK referendum in favour of a Brexit a huge leap toward an “*ever closer Union*” and “*more Europe*” will eventually become a reality. Will it, really?

Flashback in the history of European integration

Step back in the early 50's when the UK was not part of the European integration project yet; the possibility for Western Germany rearmament prompts the founding Member States of the then EEC to convene a Treaty on a proposal by France (the so-called “*Pleven Plan*”, named after France's PM at the time) establishing a supranational European army and a centralized budget and military procurement. Guess what, this Treaty was not finally ratified at the French Parliament on the grounds of a loss of national sovereignty invoked jointly through a coalition of the gaulist right and the communist left!

More Europe today?

A lot have changed obviously since then. Nowadays there is much hype on “*more Europe*” in response to the unprecedent “*existential crisis*” facing the EU itself. It often escapes our attention though that just as there is no free lunch, new structures and competences that an “*ever closer Union*” may entail do have a cost. Most of the EU Member States have been struggling



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to balance their own books accumulating debt over debt. Furthermore, Brexit or not, “*more Europe*” cannot count on the UK's second largest net contribution to the EU budget. That was precisely the meaning of the agreed “*special status*” of the UK even before the referendum in the UK. Under these circumstances the remaining EU Member States cannot be realistically expected to sacrifice their respective – and very often excessive – national spendings to the benefit of an increased EU budget. Can they?

There is no free lunch

Turning back on the exemple of defence, public opinions in France and Germany appear divided. According to the Eurobarometer the overwhelming majority in French favours “*more Europe*” in defence, with only 40% of support in Germany. It would be quite interesting however to poll a French sample and other like-minded citizens on a related question: would they be ready to provide their consent to the financing of such common, federating project through savings out of the respective national defence budgets? It is possible that a common European army and a common European defence procurement may cost far less than the sum of the individual budgets in the 28 different EU Member States; would this argument alone be enough to garner such support across Europe? Subject to further research and analysis, the most reasonable

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New structures
and competences
that an “ever closer Union”
may entail do have a cost.

answer would tend to be a negative one, wouldn't?

Other alternatives for less ambitious projects? The lion's pie in the EU budget has been consistently dedicated to agricultural expenditure, cohesion policies and all sorts of subsidies the unintended consequences of which being all too often corruption and crony capitalism (e.g. South and East Europe). Once again, the crude reality indicates that this kind of public intervention echoes by and large the wishes of the elected representatives of the Peoples and the National Governments in the decision-making system of the EU (European Parliament and Council respectively). What are the odds of a “European FBI” being funded through rationalization and budget cuts from other priorities along these lines? Can financing of “more Europe” then be expected to come through painful reshuffling or slashing of existing priorities? Will it?


More Europe or More State or More of Both altogether?

In countries with mounting debt, heavy taxation and chronic competitiveness deficits the role of the State as the sole or ultimate scriptwriter and protector of the national economy (“*esprit de dirigisme*”) against the free-market dynamics is more and more invoked across the left-right political spectrum. Such expectations however stand on the way of further completion of the EU internal market (energy, digital economy) and further liberalization of the global markets (e.g. TTIP). The biggest problem though is that they cannot be sustained in the long-run to the extent that they rely on bigger and bigger deficits, as the example of Greece has shown us.

There is a sheer, yet often hard-to-notice, difference between pro-business and pro-market legislation. Like else-

where in Europe, “Brussels” is riddled with powerful interest groups advocating for individual Member States and the EU as a whole to “protect jobs and market share” through all sorts of special privileges and exemptions from competition for particular - often dubbed “strategic” - business/industry sectors. A strengthened internal market featuring at the same time the pro-business “*esprit de dirigisme*” at the EU scale may well be considered as a plausible version of a “closer Union”, albeit at variable geometries (the countries opting for less State and more free-market staying in the periphery or outside this circle of “close partners”).

In conclusion, regardless of views on further integration in the EU the present setting is not conducive to allowing that easily for “*more Europe*”. Brexit or not, the EU itself and many of its Member States ought to firstly address the overarching questions of critical structural reforms, rationalization of public spending and less and truly better regulation. It's the statism, stupid!



NICOS GIANNIS

Defending EU macro-regions is one of our civic and pro- European commitments

The Perikles *Funeral Oration* was recorded by Thucydides in his famous *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Let me share with you a quotation from chapter 2.60:

“He who is able to diagnose the necessary (who knows what to do), but is not able to explain it clearly to others, is as if he has not thought anything. He who has both, but does not love his homeland also cannot advise properly. If he loves his home country, but cannot resist money, he can sell everything in order to win it (to win money)”¹

Thucydides speech at this part, brilliantly synthesizes his “realistic” assessment of the situation with the idealistic heroic values of the old Greek elit. This final speech is a masterpiece of ideological realism.

All is about four keywords: (1) Knowledge, (2) communication, (3) loyalty, (4) integrity.

First come knowledge, namely being able to identify knowledge, acquire or capture it, analyse, understand, learn, store, predict and anticipate events and trends, in order to take



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1 “A man possessing that knowledge without that faculty of exposition might as well have no idea at all on the matter: if he had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he would be but a cold advocate for her interests; while were his patriotism not proof against bribery, everything would go for a price”.

informed and potentially right decisions.

Following comes communication of that knowledge, knowledge sharing, in order for the target group to be not only informed but also influenced and even convinced, particularly if decision making considered its own state and destiny as outcome of this knowledge sharing. This is traditionally called democratic legitimacy.

Third comes loyalty. Loyalty is the faithful adherence to the interest and identity of the community. It can be also called patriotism. However, patriotism is reflected more and more towards multi-level communities and consequently governments, such as sub-national/local, national, macro-regional, European or even global. A portion of citizens is not concerned with any patriotism since they are pure individuals. Nevertheless, a politician should be loyal to a common vision and the common good.

Finally, following Thucydides argument, despite his/her cleverness, communication and patriotism may not act as a proof against bribery. Everybody can have his/her price. Then integrity is a virtue sine qua non.

Is a ‘Macroregional strategy’ able to address common challenges faced by a defined geographical area relating to some EU Member States and third countries located in the same neighborhood in order to achieve economic, social and territorial cohesion?

If the answer is yes, then we have to con-

vince citizens on that assumption. If we have both, the next question is if there is a macro-region type of patriotism?

Lastly, since Brussels is largely perceived, probably wrongly or partly wrongly, as a bureaucratic self-interested apparatus, ownership depends on the integrity of national and sub-national leaders of the macro-regional actors.

While looking answers to these questions, let me contribute again through Thucydides.

I am of this opinion, that the public prosperity of the city is better for private men, than if the private men themselves were in prosperity and the public wealth in collapse. For a private man in good estate, if his country comes to ruin, he will inevitably be ruined with it. Whereas he that fails in a flourishing commonwealth shall much more easily be preserved. Since then the commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and everyone cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth, why should not everyone strive to defend it?

As part of civil society and the NGOs world we all bear the same thought as Thucydides and for the need to commit ourselves to common visions, engagements and projects. We need to make more effort to defend the value of the commonwealth macro-regions for ordinary citizens, both for the well-intended and for the indifferent ones, we. Ordinary citizens usually ask, either explicit or tacit: what will be my gain?

The answer is two-fold: the big picture and best practices combined to lessons learnt.

First, we have to illustrate that the grand on-going global challenges cannot be solved by single cities, regions or countries individually. They need a collective response. The European Union in its way towards a federal democracy, a political union, is one answer. However, the macro-regional level can in many cases be the appropriate level, as collective answers there can be more concrete than at EU level, although the field is sufficiently large so that collective answers, above and beyond one single state can make a difference. This is a kind of territorially selective supra-nationalism, beyond that of state selfishness and Brussels "super-statism".

This requires a sharing of common visions regarding our common future, and that these visions are linked to concrete actions. The notion of "macro-regional impact" needs to be further specified, and concrete ways of measuring it should be proposed. At the heart of success is understanding and being able to use the web of multi-level governance structures in a project driven reality. Macro Regional Strategies can be the answer to the need of a more integrative approach to cooperation within the EU, contrib-

uting to more targeted solutions and a common ownership.

Secondly, we need to find how to handle lessons learned and good practices. Lessons learned describe constraints as key success factors. Key success factors are the elements that will determine whether the practice can be described as a "good practice". These factors will allow emergence of solutions and innovations found in order to remove the constraints encountered during the experience and learn from failures. **Lessons learned are key success factors, instead good practices are success stories.** A lesson learned is knowledge or understanding gained by experience that has a significant impact. The experience may be either positive or negative.

Lessons are knowledge, which come from experience, and that they can help, or impact, the work of others. But does that make them "Learned"? Let's look at the steps a lesson has to go through before it can be considered to be "Learned":

1. Reflect on Experience. Think back, and discuss individually or as a team what really happened.

2. Identify learning points. Where was the difference between what was planned, and what actually happened? Either a positive or a negative difference.

3. Analyse. Why was there a difference? What were the root causes?

4. Generalise. What is the learning point? What should be done in future activity to avoid the pitfall, or repeat the success? At this stage we have identified a lesson. It will be a useful lesson, if others can learn from it. And in order for others to learn from it, it needs to be instructional. In Greece we have a saying: instead of being given a goat myself, I would rather prefer to see my neighbor's goat dying. There are still citizens who think that way, because envy is predominant to their own well-being. I think that this can be found anywhere in the world, and this is what we have as civil society and active citizens to fight against. To define the appropriate answers, it first needs to develop a vision of what we want our common future to look like and the knowledge on how to achieve it. Macro-regional strategies provide a platform for developing such shared visions and knowledge about our future.

To conclude, Europe is changing and faces new global trends and grand internal challenges, bigger than elsewhere. In these turbulent but also particularly interdependent and collaborative times, macro-regional strategies hold the potential to push for appropriate answers at this level of governance, although not yet widely perceived as really necessary.

EFSTRATIOS
PROMACHOS
SOUBASSAKIS

Environmental Awareness & Protection

Let us shortly fly over human's relation to the Environment and each other!

Socrates stated in the Dialog “Menexenos” that Gaea, Mother Earth, had selected their land, Attica, to have only gentle, vegetarian animals, while beasts were in other regions on the Earth. Then, She selected and created man in this land, in order to serve her! Further, she created the prompt vegetation, so people could be fed! Men differ to animals and beasts since they had logic, feeling of justice and search for divinity. People, therefore, according to Socrates were created to respect and protect Mother Earth!

Socrates and the philosophers dedicate as the cornerstone of civilization Paideia! Everyone, in their own understanding, advice the prompt way to live is excelling and parallel protecting Nature.

Let us briefly overview how wise people arranged such way of thinking!

Initially, people were not capable to destroy because this way they were immediately suffering; chopping a large healthy tree, for example, was mostly impossible! Attacking a beast was a challenge!

People, then, formed small communities and eventually larger.

They were not many and they were acting



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in coordination, so larger animals were hunted, but still they were catching the weaker, thus preserving the overall health of the herd, like the natural reality.

The “stronger” in those settlements was mainly getting the power, controlling the way of the group, in justice and control.

Eventually and mainly in the East Mediterranean, cities were formed. The “stronger” still were controlling and ruling. As people were getting “smarter” and stronger, were requesting part of the governing. Most kings and leaders were governing with laws given to the king by gods, as claimed by the kings.

The development of those cities was dependent on the capacity of the king/ ruler. In certain cases, group of people discovered and proceeded in replacing royalty with some “better” people, so “oligarchy” was applied. Again, depending on the overall relations between oligarchy and the people, progress was resulting.

It was the time of heroes. Even the mighty Hercules, executed his twelve deeds but had to do them without getting paid and did not become a king.

Then, some kind of larger social participation was empowered, where/when people were questing from some individuals to govern them, so we have „tyranny”. Some of these tyrants were that great making it impossible to us to comprehend their superiority! Most of ancient sages were asked and became tyrants. Some rejected due to the level of the people.

Let us for a moment summarize the unique way of Athens

Parallel, we have the unique way of Athens. Peisistratus, made a series of excellent municipal works, with top of them, the library, where books were collected, including Homeric poems. Through those, Athenians, and the world since, were getting the education to respect Nature, in general, including people, animals, vegetation, natural phenomena, even the stars. For example, when some soldiers killed a wild deer, the general leader, Agamemnon, of the Achaeans in their way to Troy, had to sacrifice his child, Antigone, since he could not circumvent such "crime."

Solon, although a tyrant, he wrote laws who were for everyone! Among the laws, which were in public sight, laws forbidden cynophagy (eating dogs) that still holds in the West, killing animals for any reason, even for food, should they had not completed their biological cycle or were strong and able to pull the plow, for example. The punishment for such crimes was severe!

In Athens, due to the sequence of a series of unique governors, Democracy resulted. A product of the systems was that people could identify and appreciate leaders such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Socrates, Aspasia and Pericles. Then, we have, for the first time, Democracy implying laws for the human rights.

Athenians, Hellenic Cosmos, offered to the World what the Western world is based upon!

Then, the Roman era rises, based on the establishment of the imperial system of government, by the Macedonians, especially by Alexander the III, called Great, and his successors.

The Romans established the Pax Romana and in order to do so, they were taking goods from around the empire! For example, Sulla chopped the trees of Attica to have the necessary timber to build their navy! Further, arenas were built everywhere, among them the Coliseum in Rome, for the Romans to amuse themselves with bloody fights with victims humans and beasts alike!

Thus the rule was the strength and environment was not such an important factor in the equation.

Progressively, land, away from the capital, Rome and later Constantinople in the East was given to strong families, mainly to keep them away from the Imperial decision centers and to control the vast areas of the empire. Those feudal lords, eventually, were comprehending that the land

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Athenians and the Hellenic Cosmos, offered to the World what the Western world is based upon!
Democracy implying laws for the human rights.

and whatever was on it, including people, was their own property and were protecting to the extend they were apprehending.

Let us close our article by going over the current state-of-environment

Then, with the capitalist system, the equation became very simple! It has only one factor: Profit! Profit without ethical consideration! Thus everything is working for profit, this is the power, this is the only factor¹. Therefore, environment, even life, was not an issue! If the smoke of a train was really black and polluting did not matter, as soon as it was making profit! If a nuclear bomb assists our plans, it was OK to use it!

With the last Renaissance, in our times, people and organizations, getting Paideia, through the European and American philosophers, started comprising in the equation other issues, additionally to the profit, including ethics, environmental protection and human rights. To establish working rules and some human rights hecatombs were sacrificed.

The fight is strong, mainly in the minds of people, who have to reset their logic into greener aspects and force into constitutionalization of the Environmental Protection, both in communities and globally, including all organisms from humans to animals and vegetation and from water and air to underground and space!

¹ <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/07/environmentalists-protestors-killed-violence-global-witness-report/>

ALFONSO LLAVONA
GARCIA

Economic Growth & Crisis Management in Europe: The case of Greece

The slow Decay

The Achaean League was a Hellenistic confederation of Greek Polis. Diogenes went carrying a lamp in the daytime, claiming to be looking for an honest man. So Greece was the cradle of Western civilization. After the fall of Rome it was more advanced than Western Europe.

In 1911, a new constitution granted lifetime employment to civil servants. The change provides continuity in administration when political power changed hands. However, it gave the apparatus more power of its own and encouraged every party to bloat it. Today a quarter of working Greeks are employed in the public sector. Also the shipping sector has a lot of advantages notably fiscal from 1953 with headquarters of the most Greek firms in London. The public sector wage bill doubled over the past decade.

The shabby state railroad accumulated debts of 10 percent of GDP while raising average wages to €60,000 a year.

The state overwhelmed the private sector with about 100,000 rules adopted since 1974. Licensing requirements and fixed prices deter competition; e.g., quotas on commercial trucks were unchanged for decades. Hundreds of levies are earmarked for pension funds of particular groups of workers, e.g., 10% of ferry tickets directed to support displaced docking crews. Bribes to grease transactions, known by the *fakelaki* ("little envelopes") used to transmit them, are common. Some pension funds are



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just fronts for rich families. Rent-seeking rises corruption. Corruption has been worst among tax collectors, who pocket a percentage in return for revising down the bill.

Overall, the state's overgrowth has not spawned strong domestic objection. On the contrary, state employment is highly sought for its pay and job security. Lobbying is intense for additional state protection. The state has built support through expansion of pension benefits. Retirement ages were lowered to 55 for men and 50 for women in 2008 in more than 600 professions considered "arduous": hairdressers, radio announcers, waiters, musicians..... Most current pensioners retired before age 60. Most pensions were pegged at 70% or more of final wages, well above OECD norms. Pension fraud has been rampant.

A pay-as-you-go pension system ultimately depends on taxes on current workers; their numbers or productivity must be growing fast enough to keep the burden manageable. Greece's labour force isn't.

Fertility has dropped below replacement: there are 35% fewer 20-year-olds than 40-year olds and even fewer 10-year-olds or babies. Currently, Greece has one person 65 or over for every three people between 20 and 64. That ratio will double by 2050, according to projections See Charts 1 and 2. (The projections are relatively optimistic as they assume some recovery in fertility and ignore potentially large emigration).




Chart 1: U.S. Census Bureau's International Division




Chart 2: U.S. Census Bureau's International Division

The focus on the old deprives the young. Education is falling. Greece spends about half the OECD average on elementary and middle schooling. Tests of 15-year-olds in 2006 showed Greece below the OECD average. Graduation rates from university – free but state-controlled and bureaucratic – rank among the lowest in the OECD. The Greek Constitution bans private universities.

Political Interferences

Nazi Germany occupied Greece; Allied pressure forced it out but triggered a bitter civil war between right and left, which British and American helped the right. A military junta seized power between 1967 and 1974 and received U.S. support for its anti-communist stance. Greece retains strong militant leftist movements including a hard-core Communist Party. Decades of heavy EU subsidies have encouraged profligacy.

With more financial rope, the Greek state proceeded to hang itself. While conditionality rightly required economic liberalization and cutbacks in state perks, Greece focused on squeezing the private sector raising taxes on the little guys, cutting their benefits and trying to stamp out the shadow economy. Meanwhile it deferred public sector layoffs and dragging its heels on deregulation. Naturally the economy plummeted, unemployment shot up, and deficit gaps became even harder to close. See Chart 3.

If Greece had accepted a major devaluation and default without coming undone, the intense pain would almost




Chart 3: Variations GDP Greece – IMF

surely have given way by now to rebound. Instead, the Greek economy continues to sink.

A more direct measure is unit labour costs. From 1995 to 2007, they increased by 61% in Greece while falling 3% in Germany. Moreover, the Greek labour market stayed very rigid – e.g., required severance payments for senior workers are twice the OECD norm and deter new hiring – whereas Germany loosened its labour restrictions.

Granted, Greece and Germany rarely compete directly in manufacturing. However, rigidities also abound in tourism, where Greece has a natural comparative advantage but




Chart 4

competes with countries like Turkey, which offers lower prices and rapidly improving service. As productivity has dropped due to crisis disruption, unit labour costs in Greece are about the same as they were five years ago, despite the drop in nominal wages.

Other Path to be Taken by Greece

Greece will recover. How? The path the EU/ECB/IMF troika recommends is extremely grinding. For one thing, real Greek prices and wages likely need to fall an additional 15% or more over the next five years to restore competitiveness. In the meantime, potential Greek and foreign investors will incline to sit on the sidelines, waiting for costs to drop and political risks to recede. Confidence will continue to wither, if there's any left.

From Greek workers' perspective, between declining fertility, early retirement, longer life spans, disability claims, and high unemployment, only about one in three Greeks is actively employed. Those 3.5 million workers effectively shoulder nearly €100,000 each in government debt, while paying over €5,000 per year in others' pension costs. Without radical changes these burdens get worse over time as the labour force shrinks and numbers of pensioners grow.

Greece would need to slash public spending on the order of 20% of GDP, or about three times what it has done already. No democracy has ever come close to that. Greek voters aren't in the mood to try. Greek workers will need to pay an extra 15 percent of income in taxes, if not more, to help Greece meet its pledges. The payers are the lucky




Chart 5

ones, as unemployment is 20% overall and 50% among the young. For young people, the combination is a tremendous incentive to emigrate.

Greeks have emigrated in droves. More than one million Greeks emigrated from 1950 to 1974, though many returned later. Unemployment and social conflicts are reduced and revenues are increased from abroad but because of imbalances an old-age home called Greece can't pay for itself, much less repay others.

The above figures (OECD Economic Surveys Greece March 2016 OVERVIEW) show the current evolution:

The economy is gradually recovering from a deep recession but high social cost persists. See chart 4:

Significant structural reforms have been legislated, but their mix and implementation were uneven. See chart 5:

Stronger exports & Investments are a key to sustained recovery. See chart 6:

A sharp devaluation, with drachma temporarily decoupled from the euro, offers much better prospects. The real burden of pensions and public sector wages immediately plummets. Real prices overshoot, creating investment opportunities for Greeks and foreigners alike. Confidence recovers as people feel the worse is behind. Devaluation is no panacea, as Greece knows all too well. Domestic inflation can quickly eat up gains in competitiveness and destabilize the economy. There's no substitute for policy discipline, which Greece has not yet displayed.

Greece will not plunge into anarchy, re-ignite civil war, or isolate itself like Belarus, North Korea or Burma. Argen-




Chart 6

tine populism seems remote even if the Argentina's growth rebound and its "corralito" will appeal to many Greeks. Like federalist country isn't a bad model for Greece. Also the cooperative model of Emilia-Romagna is interesting for Greece. A specific analyse balancing region by region would be utile. The overriding factor is membership in the EU. It appeals for its perks, for its stability, and for its connections with other Europeans.

Other Eastern European countries entered in the EU. Peoples were less familiar with markets and market discipline. Some leaders were inept or corrupt. Reform dialogue was confused. But their different paths converge toward the EU. Greeks are no less keen on the EU. They just got spoiled on the back of debt they couldn't handle and a state leviathan they couldn't restrain. They need to come to terms with the mess they've created for themselves. Once they do, they will rejoin the euro with more responsibility and joy. The troika's program isn't fair to either Greek workers or German taxpayers. If Greece abandons it will flame out. Greece will devalue old entitlements and the perks of the state. A phoenix will emerge from the ashes, bearing the vitality of private firms and the Greece's young. But for this a sound management of VAT and Tax revenue of riches and big firms together with the back of the assets abroad are essential. Also the development of moderns Greek shipyards like suppliers of the big Greek shipowners will be very important. It must be a matter of patriotism of the rich Greeks. Labour market institutions should balance the objectives of increasing jobs, reallocating workers to where they can earn the most, and ensuring the fruits of the economic recovery are widely shared.

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OECD Economic Surveys Greece March 2016 OVERVIEW



ATHINA
GIANNOUTSOU

This time
is it different?

The “Spitzenkandidaten” process

One of the major characteristics of the European Parliament elections of 2014, (the first ones to take place after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) was the “Spitzenkandidaten” process, according to which the European Commission President’s appointment shall be held through the EP elections. This is a significant innovation, at least comparing to the Parliament’s previous role, confined in approving or rejecting the candidate proposed by the European Council. And certainly one at least, aiming at strengthening the Parliament’s role in that regard.

Accordingly, a direct link between the Parliament and the EU citizens ought to be established. Both the European Commission and the European Parliament wanted to personify the elections and increase the visibility, in order to attract voters¹. Hence the slogan: “This time it is different.” Five European political parties nominated a lead candidate for this position. All five “Spitzenkandidaten” held a European campaign: television debates and official visits. And for the first time, the EU voter could vote for a MEP but also for the next EC President.

Each European political party opted for its procedure based on its own values and traditions. However, the processes needed to be: transparent, democratic and open. EPP held a Congress, whereby 825 Delegates elected J.C. Juncker. On the other hand, M. Schulz came out as the only PES candidate meeting all the criteria and, thus, was appointed in the PES Congress in Rome 2014. ALDE’s two

frontrunners agreed to appoint Guy Verhofstadt. The Greens was arguably the only party coming close to a transparent, democratic and open process, by organising online primaries accessible to all EU citizens, with the only criterion being the age of 16 years old. With regards to GUE/NGL, Tsipras was officially appointed in the Madrid Congress in December 2013. Nevertheless, there has been a scarcity of information in this regard. Last, ECR did not nominate a candidate, as it considered the elections as too federalist.


Consequently, the Groups’ internal processes have been characterised by constraints, which should be addressed before the European Elections 2019. EPP aimed at maintaining its power internally and leaving room for the best candidate to compete and get elected. PES and ALDE processes, did not let any political competition, as PES opted for a sort of closed primary (appointment by national activists) whereas ALDE favoured party cohesion. Last, Greens opted for a process, which was open to all EU voters. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the appointment is doubtful as a result of the low voters’ turnout (22.000 citizens).

In conclusion, a direct link between European elections – party coming first- Candidate for the Commission’s Presidency did not really occur. In spite of the claims that the first party’s Candidate would win the EC Presidency, the Council did not directly accept it. After deliberations and political compromises, Juncker was nominated by the Council on June 27 and got approved by the Parliament on July 16.

Athina
Giannoutsou

*Accredited Assistant
at the European
Parliament*

¹ Given that the turnout is less than 50% since 1999.



The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West

by Alexandros Petersen

NOTES ON BOOKS BY MAQUINA LECTORA

On January 2014, Taliban suicide bombers attacked a Lebanese restaurant in Kabul. Twenty-one people were killed, among them was Alexandros Petersen a scholar of geopolitics, and energy politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the time of his death Alexandros was working as an Assistant Professor in political science at the American University campus in Afghanistan.

In his book, *The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West*, Alexandros Petersen is making a case for the West to pursue a strategy around Russia's perimeter, with the aim of integrating the smaller nations of the former Soviet Union more deeply into Western-oriented market and democratic institutions.

Petersen's Twenty-First-Century Geopolitical Strategy for Eurasia (21CGSE) sets out and communicates what is at stake for the West in the Eurasian theatre, and provides a joint framework for trans-Atlantic cooperation. Its most important policy implication

is the restoration of geopolitical purpose to Western institutions such as NATO, EU and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), among others, by arguing that their activities and expansion should be refocused in Eurasia.

By *Eurasia* or "World Island", Peterson means the mega-continent that divided into Europe, the Middle East, East and South Asia and Africa, which really constitutes one land surrounded by one giant interconnected ocean. The term was first introduced by Harold Mackinder, a British geographer, academic and politician, and was used to describe the area that stretches from the eastern borders of Germany to the western border of China and from the Arctic Circle to the South Asian deserts and mountain ranges. In the future, Petersen argues, this area will be deemed to be of decisive strategic importance to the United States and its West European allies.

Mackinder formulated his geopolitical ideas shortly before and after World War I in opposition to those of A.T. Mahan, who argued that sea-power is the key to world domination. Mackinder argued that the most important part of the world, geopolitically speaking, is the Pivot Area or Heartland of Eurasia, which lay at the centre of the world island, stretching from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic, a vast territory controlled by Russia.


"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world."

Harold Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, 1919.



Petersen argues *that* the pivotal importance of the Heartland still remains *and the West* needs to actively engage with the small nations in the periphery of Russia, the post-Soviet territories e.g. Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, etc, in order to prevent Russian and/or Chinese dominance. It is a comprehensive analysis of the ideas of Mackinder and Kennan's "Containment", combined with Josef Pilsudski's "Prometheism" and "Intermarum" policies. Josef Pilsudski, the first leader of the modern Polish state as it emerged after the end of World War I, aimed to create a fortress of common defence against Russia that would include independent states in the basins of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas, arguing that "any great Eurasian power would crumble if its many minorities were empowered from without".

The World Island arms the reader with insights and ideas in order to better understand the basics of geopolitics in the region. Petersen's arguments are both thought-provoking and controversial, but often they are vaguely defined and they lack imagination. How do you contain a big country like Russia, especially when its fellow BRICS do not wish to isolate it? He also fails to answer fundamental questions, such as, what if, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 when the EU was visibly not in the 'most robust health', Central Asian countries do not have strong incentives for institutional change and find that the Chinese alternative is more attractive and beneficial for their economic development albeit less oriented towards democratization.



Animate Europe – Europe Fast Forward

by Markus Kaizer


"What will Europe, what will the European Union look like in 50, 100, 250 years?" – The comic book collection "Animate Europe – Europe Fast Forward", which exhibits seven comics strips from young European artists, tries to answer this question in an artistic manner.

In the preceding competition, Nicole Knötig was awarded first prize for her story simply called "The Union". The young German artist tells a story about a hypothetical spilt-up of the European Union into a rich Northern and a poor Southern part. Her story picks up many of the concerns many Europeans share these days: The migration crisis, the financial crisis, the different standards of living in Northern and Southern Eu-

rope, growing euroscepticism as well as the eternal and universal pursuit of happiness. Especially the migration crisis – epitomized through a dead body on the beach and later the migration of two of the story's characters – is more topical than ever.

Knötig's tale is not the only comic strip addressing current difficulties. Ben Bredsdorff's visual poem "Europe 2065" shows the collapse not only of the Eurozone but the entire European Union. Although it is quite easy at the moment to draw a negative picture of the EU, many stories still illustrate positive endings and come up with solutions to the EU's current problems. All of the authors ultimately dream of a Europe as a place with more tolerance, more togetherness and more European spirit.

The book not only collects the views of young people who have grown up living in the European Union. It also provides new perspectives on recent political and social discussions and therefore gives some food for thought and debate. The mixture of text and pictures is used as a powerful tool to fuel imagination, and to make the European Union more tangible for everyone.



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Hamilton, The Federalist